Immigrant Political Participation in Europe
Comparing Different Forms of Political Action across Groups

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Abstract

This paper compares participation in different forms of political action between natives, immigrants and non-citizen immigrants using data from thirteen European countries across six waves of the European Social Survey. The authors highlight problems associated with previous categorizations of political action, and find that when political action is disaggregated and relative participation between groups is examined, that immigrants’ patterns of participation are not substantially different from those of natives. When comparing citizen immigrants to non-citizen immigrants, previous research has suggested that citizenship acts as a “ticket” to non-institutional, unconventional, confrontational forms of political action. The authors’ findings instead suggest a more complicated relationship between immigrant/citizenship status and preferences for political action since citizenship may facilitate participation in both so-called institutional and extra-institutional activities depending on the context of action.

Keywords

political participation – immigrants – non-citizens – protest

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Introduction

The integration of immigrant groups into European society (which includes a growing presence of non-citizen immigrants) continues to be a salient political issue in Europe. While citizen and non-citizen immigrants have been present in European countries for decades, there was little expectation that they would be politically active, particularly in so-called “extra-institutional” forms of action, which are often associated with public, more costly (and riskier) disruptive activities like protest demonstrations (Martiniello 2005). More recent evidence suggests that like natives, immigrant citizens and non-citizens do participate in a range of political activities from petition signing to protest demonstrations (see Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn 2008; Just and Anderson 2012; de Rooij 2012; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). However, for immigrants (particularly non-citizens) whose legal and social status is more fragile, public, disruptive and potentially more confrontational activities like protest demonstrations may be both riskier and more costly than they are for natives (Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn 2008; Just and Anderson 2012). Immigrants, and particularly non-citizens, may therefore be wary of participating in these types of action. Research therefore points to several questions: are immigrants as politically active as natives? Do immigrants who are not citizens participate similarly to those who have citizenship? Do patterns of activity across types of political action differ between these groups (natives, immigrant citizens, and immigrant non-citizens)? Do differences in these patterns suggest that immigrant citizens and non-citizens are wary of (or, conversely, drawn to) types of action traditionally labeled as either institutional (or conventional) or non-institutional actions (or unconventional)?

Recent comparative studies of immigrant political participation in Europe (Just and Anderson 2012; de Rooij 2012) concluded that immigrant groups, particularly non-citizens, are less inclined to participate overall, and are particularly less likely to participate in what were framed as higher cost, disruptive forms of action. By and large, these findings were interpreted in terms of the lack of social and political resources associated with immigrant and non-citizen status, suggesting that this suppresses their levels of participation in higher cost or more disruptive forms of action compared to natives. Yet, theories of political participation and collective action offer a competing expectation: that precisely because of their limited access to conventional social and political resources, and their marginalization from political institutions,
immigrant groups may prefer so-called extra-institutional forms of political action, like protest demonstrations. Thus, the literature on immigrant political participation provides two plausible and competing theories about action, with scholars using one or the other to justify their empirical claims: political outsiders are either empowered by inclusion to participate in extra-institutional activities or, their inclusion increases their participation in institutional forms of political action.

We posit that competing claims about how and why immigrant and non-citizen political participation varies are strongly driven by conceptual and definitional ambiguities around political participation. In this paper, we therefore avoid *a priori* classifications of types of political participation (for example by cost, institutionality, or disruptiveness). This gives a clearer picture of the differences and similarities in participation patterns by immigration status. Using this approach, we find that the overwhelming picture is one of similarity. Although immigrants, and particularly non-citizens, are overall less likely than natives to participate politically, their patterns of participation across different types of activity are very similar. Where there are differences, our results suggest that these are not well captured by traditional classifications of political activity. When comparing immigrant citizens to non-citizens, our findings suggest that rather than acting as a ticket to participation in unconventional forms of action, citizenship may in fact also encourage participation in more conventional or institutional actions. We suggest that there may be other dimensions of political action in addition to costs and institutionality that are more useful when comparing patterns of political participation between groups.

We begin the paper by situating theories of immigrant political participation within the broader literature on political and collective action. We outline three basic scenarios about absolute and relative levels of participation in different forms of action. We then discuss the ways in which political participation is conceptualized and categorized particularly in terms of underlying assumptions about the costs of participating in different types of action. Before describing our data and methods, we outline concerns about how immigrant and non-citizen immigrant political participation is measured and how this might shape conclusions about their political involvement. In our discussion, we raise questions about the necessity of developing separate theoretical frameworks for understanding immigrant political participation, and highlight the importance of linking individual and contextual factors thought to influence preferences for different types of action.
Immigrant Citizen and Non-Citizen Political Participation: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations

The literature on immigrant political participation has focused on electoral forms of participation (or lack thereof), often ignoring the ways in which immigrant citizens and non-citizens participate in other forms of political action (for a review and critique, see Atger 2009). Consequently, theoretical expectations surrounding immigrant citizen and non-citizen involvement are often inconsistent and contradictory.

The literature alludes to three potential scenarios regarding immigrant citizen and non-citizen participation. The first is based on the notion that immigrants, especially non-citizen immigrants, are politically impotent or inefficacious (see Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young 2011 and Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young 2015 on efficacy and collective action) primarily because they are excluded from social and political institutions and, in the case of non-citizens, are mostly disenfranchised. Consequently, immigrants’ (and especially non-citizens’) policy preferences and grievances are of little interest to politicians seeking election or re-election. As Munro (2008:6) claimed, “Where non-citizen residents lack the right to vote, political candidates lack meaningful incentives to be responsive to their concerns.” Under these conditions, immigrants (and particularly non-citizens) are expected to have extremely low levels of overall political participation relative to natives.

The second scenario (which does not preclude the first) assumes that immigrant citizens and non-citizens have different preferences when it comes to political participation. Just and Anderson (2012) claimed that the main difference between citizen and non-citizen immigrants – citizenship status – shapes preferences for certain kinds of political action. This claim is based on previous work suggesting that due to the precarious or fragile legal and social status of non-citizens, they are unlikely to participate in costly, disruptive, or confrontational forms of action (see Varsanyi 2005; Lee 2008). Just and Anderson argued that citizenship helps to mitigate this effect by providing immigrants with the legal and psychosocial resources necessary for extra-institutional political participation (for example, in demonstrations and strikes).

In contrast to this second scenario, a third possibility is that precisely because of their exclusion from social and political institutions, immigrants should in fact be more likely to participate in extra-institutional forms of action, including potentially more disruptive and confrontational actions like protest demonstrations. Many institutional forms of action, such as contacting a politician or signing a petition, which typically impose relatively few costs on individuals, rely on the ability to effect change via political institutions. These
types of actions are therefore likely to be considerably less effective for immigrants, especially for non-citizens. Simply put, why would individuals who are excluded from political institutions (whether informally or statutorily) prefer forms of political participation that rely on their institutionality to be effective? Indeed, this expectation is congruent with existing general theories of political participation and social movement mobilization. For instance, a key feature of political process theory is that governments that are unreceptive to challengers make individual preferences for higher cost forms of action more attractive precisely because they occur outside of institutions (on the “general political context”, see Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1992; on “context of resistance,” see Boudreau 1996; Opp 2009 on micro-level mechanisms in political process theory). Numerous studies have shown that political opportunity structures shape immigrant protest behavior (for example, on Vietnamese refugees and Portuguese immigrants in Canada and the US, see Bloemraad 2006; and on migrants in Britain and Germany, see Koopmans and Statham 1999).

In sum, the latter two expectations provide competing frameworks for understanding native and immigrant/citizen political participation. When immigrant citizens and non-citizens do participate, their patterns of participation can either point to preferences for so-called extra-institutional action, or to participation in more institutional forms that are generally thought to incur fewer costs/risks. Taken together, these scenarios present a conundrum which may contribute to lower levels of political participation: immigrants (and especially non-citizen immigrants) should not participate in extra-institutional action (especially if these actions are disruptive and confrontational) because they are a fragile group, but at the same time, would not find institutional forms of action (which are typically lower cost and non-disruptive/non-confrontational) available or efficacious because they are either excluded from the political process or disenfranchised. Overall, diverse literatures on the topic do not always provide clear guidance about what patterns of political participation by immigration status should look like. This problem is exacerbated by the ways in which forms of political action are conceptualized and operationalized.

**Defining Types of Political Action**
The range of political action has been conceptualized, defined, and categorized in numerous but related ways. Some think of political participation as either normative or non-normative where normative actions are conventional in that they do not put participants in danger of social marginalization (Tausch, Becker, Spears, et al. 2011; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans...
Others prefer terms like “conventional” and “non-conventional” (see Klandermans 1983). Social movement scholars often define political activism in terms of how it challenges institutions, conventions and authority structures (see Gamson 1975; Bass and Casper 1999; Jost et al. 2011; see also Cress and Snow 2000 for a review). Not surprisingly, movement scholars often use terms like “confrontational” versus “non-confrontational” and “institutional” versus “extra-institutional” participation (Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011).

Given these definitions, signing a petition is usually understood as less costly than participating in a strike or demonstration since it does not interfere with the “daily routines of ordinary citizens,” whereas disruptive actions, ranging from strikes to riots and violent protest, are typically attention-grabbing events that defy the social order and everyday routines (Jost et al. 2011, 199). Generally, petition signing and voting are considered normative or conventional, while protest behaviors are considered non-normative or unconventional. However, opinions differ. For example, some scholars have defined legal demonstrations as normative since protest demonstrations have become more common in democratic societies (see Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Norris 2002; Rucht 2007; see also Pettinicchio 2012 and von Zomeren 2013 on “everyday activism”).

Drawing from the political process tradition, social movement scholars view the nature of political action as in part shaped by openings and contractions in the political opportunity structure as this alters the costs and benefits of individual participation (Opp 2009). Extra-institutional activities (like protest demonstrations) are preferred when political opportunities are closed and consequently, access to institutional channels is limited (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Martinez 2008). For this reason, the use of institutional tactics (including petition signing, see Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1992 on petitions as institutional tactics), are less costly and are more effective when states are receptive to challenges. In other words, if governments are unsympathetic towards a cause or issue, contacting a politician or signing a petition may not be perceived as likely to obtain a desired outcome, thereby making the use of extra-institutional action relatively more desirable despite its inherent cost.

Thus, regardless of the conceptual scheme used, the underlying assumption of most theories of political participation is that involvement in political action, especially collective action, is rather rare because of the costs it imposes on individuals (von Zomeren 2016; Opp 2009). Even when including one-shot activities that can be done privately and with little coordination (such as boycott, contacting a politician or signing a petition), only about half of the pooled sample across ESS waves reported participating in at least one type of political action.
Costs are often understood in terms of the nature of the activity in relation to individual characteristics like employment, education, family and social ties that shape preferences for certain types of activities (on biographical availability and high cost/risk collective action, see McAdam, 1986 and Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). Costly activities are often linked to risky ones. Disruptive and confrontational forms of participation like protest demonstrations can be both costly and risky and therefore, stronger commitment is necessary to overcome barriers to participation (Olson 1965; Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982; Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011). For instance, in their recent classification of different forms of political action using the World Values Survey (WVS), Corcoran et al. (2015) included signing petitions and joining boycotts as low cost forms of action because they do not require a lot of time and resources. Although they treated strikes and riots as high cost forms of action because of the costs and risks they impose, they defined lawful demonstrations as a moderate cost form of political action because while they require time and resources, they are more normative and thus not as risky as strikes and riots.

However, risk is but one factor shaping costs. Klandermans (2004) defined types of political action based on risk and effort on the one hand and time on the other, thereby acknowledging that some activities can be high risk/effort and short lived like a protest and others can be high effort and of long duration like volunteering in an organization. But, effort and risk do not always coincide. No doubt, short-term participation in a protest or strike may require a lot of effort and may be risky. However, other longer term commitments like working for a political party or social movement organization may not be risky, yet still require more effort than signing a petition or participating in a boycott even though all three activities are “institutional.” To complicate matters, activities like boycotts can be short or long term and can impose various amounts of cost depending on alternatives when exiting “the market” (Friedman 1991; Hirschman 1970).

Given these characteristics of political action – effort, risk, cost and duration – it makes sense that individuals’ preferences for political action are largely shaped by their biographical characteristics and availability. We can reasonably assume that employed individuals with dependents who have limited availability (and may also have limited resources) prefer a low risk, one-shot activity like signing a petition than working for a political party or protesting. This is the case regardless of immigrant and citizenship status since it is generally the case that all individuals see their actions as means to achieve some valued outcome, and weigh this against the costs of participation. This is at the heart of value-expectancy theory (see Olson 1965; Klandermans 1984; Opp 2009; Corcoran, et al. 2011; Corcoran, et al. 2015).
Unfortunately, most cross-national studies of political participation using surveys like the ESS and the WVS forego details about the nature of political participation in favor of sample size at both the individual and country levels. Nonetheless, measures of political participation used in (but not limited to) cross-national studies often reflect a range of activities in part meant to capture existing conceptual schemes and categorizations. Typically, studies using the WVS rely on five items to capture political action: signing a petition, participating in a boycott, striking, participating in a legal demonstration, and occupying a building. These items have been subsequently employed in other datasets (see Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn, 2008). The ESS includes a similar but broader set of items. Respondents are not asked about strikes or occupying a building. However, they are additionally asked about wearing a campaign badge, contacting a politician/elected official, and working for a political party or other organization. This broader spectrum of items allows us to better compare different types of political action which can be mapped onto other related typologies distinguishing, for example, “low cost/risk” from “high cost/risk”, “confrontational” from “non-confrontational”, or “institutional” from “non-institutional” actions.

The way in which political action is conceptualized, defined and operationalized has a direct bearing on immigrant citizen and non-citizen political participation. Most studies of immigrant political participation suggest that their levels of political involvement are depressed as a consequence of biographical unavailability, lack of material and psychological resources, and few organizational/social ties (see Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1989; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In addition, their preferences for action are shaped by the extent of their exclusion from social and political institutions. Exclusion and disenfranchisement may decrease overall levels of political participation among immigrant groups but it is less clear how these factors shape their preferences for different types of political action. Adding to these ambiguities, the numerous typologies described in this paper are often conflated or used interchangeably. Although these typologies are related and can overlap, their use as such has masked more nuanced patterns in political participation among individuals and groups.

**Measuring Immigrant Political Participation**

Two recent and prominent studies of immigrant political participation in Europe, conducted by de Rooij (2012) and Just and Anderson (2012), both analyzed ESS data. de Rooij claimed that as immigrants become more integrated,

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1 For a review and critique of measuring protest demonstrations, see Biggs (2014).
their pattern of participation should increasingly resemble that of natives. She found that for immigrants, citizenship is positively associated with increased participation in what she referred to as “unconventional” political activities. Similarly, Just and Anderson found that immigrant citizens participated in more extra-institutional actions than did non-citizens, and at about the same levels as natives. Both studies appear to suggest that integration of immigrants should see a convergence in their patterns of participation with that of natives, especially their participation in extra-institutional forms of political action. Accordingly, citizenship and political integration make immigrants and non-citizen immigrants less wary of participating in political action including more public, coordinated and potentially disruptive forms.

While providing useful insights, these recent cross-national studies also highlight two related theoretical and empirical problems involved in comparing immigrant and native political participation in different types of action. The first relates to how political participation is measured and conceptualized. Both de Rooij and Just and Anderson aggregated individuals’ participation in each action into additive indices of conventional/unconventional, or institutional/un-institutional action respectively. This practice is prevalent in the literature on political participation. However, a linear additive measure implies that the jump between each point on the scale (for example, 0-5 activities) is equally important. Yet, as Just and Anderson acknowledged (p. 492), about half of their total ESS sample did not participate in any form of political action at all. It seems clear, particularly in the case of high-cost extra-institutional activities, that moving from “no participation” to “some participation” is more meaningful than moving from participating in one activity to participating in two (or from two to three, etc.).

A second problem arises from the way in which both de Rooij and Just and Anderson draw from previous work (see Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002) to categorize political activities. de Rooij classified voting, wearing a campaign badge, working for a political party or action group, working in another type of organization, or contacting an elected representative as conventional actions, and taking part in a boycott, signing a petition, or taking part in a lawful demonstration as unconventional actions. Just and Anderson used an alternative typology (institutional vs. un-institutional), but similarly classified contacting a politician, working in a political party or other organization, wearing

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2 Aggregating items into one measure (either as a binary to capture overall participation or a count to get at the extent of participation) is quite common and the items together are often treated as a measure of collective action and/or protest involvement (see Klandermans 1997; Klandermans et al. 2008; van Zomeren and Iyer 2009; Biggs 2014).
a campaign badge, and donating money to a political party together as institutional actions; separately from signing a petition, taking part in a boycott, participating in legal or illegal protests, and buying products for ethical, environmental, or political reasons (un-institutional actions).

Categories like extra-institutional, unconventional, confrontational and disruptive may be *prima facie* valid because it is assumed that they include higher cost/risk forms of political participation. Indeed, as we noted, the notion of costs and risks undergirds most of these categorizations where terms like unconventional and extra-institutional are often used interchangeably. However, as we and others have also pointed out, it is not always the case that extra-institutional tactics are more costly or require more effort than institutional ones (for example participating once in a legal demonstration versus long-term volunteering in a social movement group) or that petitions and boycotts require the same effort and involvement and impose the same risk as a strike or protest. If the assumption is that unconventional or un-institutional activities are inherently costlier/riskier, treating petitions and boycotts as unconventional or un-institutional therefore seems problematic. In addition, given the lack of information about the duration, targets, goals and motivations underlying political participation from the items included in cross-national survey data, it is difficult to determine the extent of unconventionality, disruption and cost associated with different types of actions justifying a dichotomous conventional/unconventional categorization. This problem is especially salient when applying theories of political participation specifically to immigrants.

Just and Anderson hypothesized that citizen immigrants should have the material, legal, and psychological resources required to engage in un-institutional types of action, *explicitly referring to un-institutional actions as costly*. However, they categorized petition signing, which is one of the lowest cost, most common forms of political participation (see Caren et al. 2011; Dalton et al. 2009; Corcoran et al. 2011), as un-institutional, alongside less frequent and potentially more costly/risky and disruptive forms of participation like demonstrations.3 This clearly illustrates the problem of conflating institutionality with costs and risks. de Rooij acknowledged the problem explicitly noting that petition signing, while considered “unconventional,” is still low-cost. Nevertheless, like Just and Anderson, de Rooij’s dependent variable situated petition signing among other higher cost forms of action like protest demonstrations.

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3 For example, according to the WVS, roughly twice as many people have ever signed a petition than have ever participated in a legal demonstration, three times as many have signed a petition than have joined a boycott, and more than six times as many have signed a petition than have occupied a building or participated in a strike.
No doubt, petitions have been an important part of social movement tactical repertoires (see Earl and Kimport 2011; Kriesi 1989). But, as Dalton and colleagues explained in a footnote (Dalton et al. 2009: 62), petition signing “is a basic democratic right and part of conventional democratic politics,” and is arguably neither unconventional nor extra-institutional. Indeed, petition signing has been treated similarly to activities like donating money (which Just and Anderson consider institutional) and as a one-shot, low cost, low risk form of participation requiring minimal effort (see McAdam 1986; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Kriesi’s study of the Dutch Peace Movement found that many more individuals signed a petition than participated in the movement, and that for many, signing a petition reflected “their limit of involvement” relative to more “active” forms of participation (Kriesi 1989: 1096). He went on to say (p. 1098) that:

Strangely enough, many more people say they have signed the petition than indicate they have participated in the movement, and there are even somewhat more people who say they have signed the petition than people who are ready to participate in the movement. Apparently, signing the petition was not always perceived as a form of participation in a peace movement activity, at least not by a majority of those who signed.

Yet, this is not so strange from the point of view of Olson’s theory because “Forms of collective action that impose few personal costs on individual participants will take place more frequently than those that impose greater costs. This helps explain why ethnic voting and lobbying (which impose few costs) are so much more common than ethnically based guerilla wars” (Hechter et al. 1982:420). Including petition signing alongside activities like protest demonstrations may therefore give us a misleading picture of who is participating in higher-cost, more unconventional types of political action.

As Table 1 shows, both Just and Anderson and de Rooij reported higher levels of participation in unconventional/un-institutional types of action, with de Rooij reporting an approximate 2:1 ratio of participation in unconventional versus conventional actions. This runs against general theories of participation which claim that higher cost forms of participation are much less frequent than lower cost forms. We argue that treating petition signing as un-institutional/unconventional is likely to be driving these unexpected results. Note that when we re-categorized petition signing as institutional (the rows headed “Re-categorized” in Table 1; all other activities were classified as in Just and Anderson), not only are levels of participation reversed as indicated by the negative sign in the delta columns, but the differences between institutional
Table 1  Comparing differential political participation between natives, immigrant citizens and immigrant non-citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natives / majority</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Citizen immigrants</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Non-citizen immigrants</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Western immigrants</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>Non-Western immigrants</th>
<th>Δ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Just and Anderson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>30.84</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.74</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Un-institutional</td>
<td>46.01</td>
<td>15.17</td>
<td>47.45</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>de Rooij</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unconventional</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Our study</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>39.99</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.29</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>27.69</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Extra-Institutional</td>
<td>36.37</td>
<td>-3.62</td>
<td>37.82</td>
<td>-1.47</td>
<td>32.32</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
<td>n/a</td>
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Note: Numbers in the headed columns are the percentage of each group who report having participated in each type of action. Numbers in the delta columns are the percentage point difference in participation rates between the two forms of action.
and extra-institutional participation across groups are also substantially different (especially for non-citizen immigrants). Although they still participated less overall than natives and citizen immigrants, when we re-categorized political action, non-citizens are the only group to report higher levels of extra-institutional participation relative to institutional participation. However, after re-categorizing participation, the gap between non-citizen participation in institutional and extra-institutional action becomes much smaller than what prior studies reported. This shows that small changes to how activities are classified can have significant effects on the results.

Table 1 highlights a related problem, which is the lack of attention paid to differences between groups in terms of their patterns of participation across activity type, where dichotomizing political participation masks these group differences. Disaggregating these categories of action and examining relative rates of participation across each activity gives us a more complete picture of how groups differ in their political participation preferences. Immigrants have lower overall levels of participation but may also have different preferences for certain types of action. Their preferences may be shaped by their lack of social and political resources as well as their legal status, which has been assumed would lead to a stronger preference for low-cost, low-risk types of action like petition signing. On the other hand, immigrants and particularly non-citizens as a result of their exclusion may to a greater extent than natives, prefer not to sign petitions – since they have little ability to formally sanction elected officials.4 They may instead prefer boycotts (see Pulido 2007) and strikes or demonstrations (see Martiniello 2005).

In the analyses reported below, we investigate these questions by examining the detailed political participation patterns of natives, immigrant citizens, and non-citizens – without pre-imposing a particular classification of activity types. In our analyses, we also account for a large number of covariates thought to explain differences in participation between these groups.

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4 See Kriesi et al. 1992 and Parry, Smith and Henry 2011. While Harris and Gillion (2010) referred to all activities outside the electoral process as unconventional and extra-institutional (including signing petitions), they simultaneously alluded to the fact that petition signing can be considered an institutional tactic given that often, voters sign petitions because they are backed by an ability to reprimand elected officials if they do not address their grievances.
Data and Methods

For our primary analyses, we used pooled data from the first six waves of the European Social Survey. The ESS is a cross-national survey which has been conducted biennially since 2002. Within each country, random probability sampling is used to obtain a representative sample of non-institutional residents aged 15 and above, with a target minimum response rate of 70%.

The ESS is appropriate for testing differential political participation among immigrant citizens and non-citizens as it includes substantial numbers of these individuals across countries. Their proportions in the ESS sample appear to reflect actual proportions of immigrant citizens and non-citizens, as reported in official statistics such as Eurostat (Just and Anderson 2012:491). In addition to numerous biographical characteristics, the survey contains questions about immigrants’ time in the host country and whether the individual speaks the national language at home. As noted above, the ESS also includes questions on a broad range of political activities.

In our primary analyses, we included data from 13 countries which were present in all six waves of the ESS: Belgium (N=10,808), Denmark (N=9,334), Finland (N=12,188), France (N=11,064), Germany (N=17,445), the Republic of Ireland (N=13,100), the Netherlands (N=11,586), Norway (N=10,267), Portugal (N=12,453), Spain (N=11,618), Sweden (N=11,048), Switzerland (N=10,803), and the U.K. (13,403). Following Just and Anderson, we excluded Hungary, Poland and Slovenia from our analysis because their national samples included no, or very few, non-citizen immigrants.

Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent analyses are based on a sample of respondents with complete data on all relevant variables (N=142,169). There was less than 1% missing values for all variables except religion (5% missing values).

Dependent Variables

The six waves of the ESS included the following question about respondents’ political participation:

There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country of residence] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following:

- Contacted a politician, government or local government official?
- Worked in a political party or action group?
• Worked in another organization or association?
• Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker?
• Signed a petition?
• Taken part in a lawful public demonstration?
• Boycotted certain products?

In order to compare participation across each activity, we coded responses to each as binary indicators for the purposes of analysis rather than grouping activities based on *a priori* assumptions about their institutionality or costliness.

**Independent Variables**

Our key independent variable, *immigration status* (Native, Citizen immigrant, or Non-citizen immigrant), was derived from two ESS items asking whether the respondent was born in their current country of residence, and whether they are a citizen of their current country (see Appendix A1 for population shares in each country).5

To account for potential demographic and socio-economic explanations for group differences in political participation, we also included a number of measures of biographical and socio-economic characteristics:

• Gender (dichotomous variable, 1=male; 0=female)
• Age (in continuous years)
• Religious affiliation (Christian, Muslim, Other, or No religion)
• Single status (1=not married or co-resident with a partner; 0=otherwise)
• Children at home (1=yes; 0=no)
• Dependent partner (1=respondent’s partner currently unemployed, unable to work due to a health problem, looking after the home or family, or in full-time education; 0=otherwise)
• Currently in full-time education (1=yes; 0=no)
• Currently unemployed (1=unemployed and looking for work, or due to long-term illness, 0=otherwise)
• Ever unemployed for more than three months (1=yes, 0=no)
• Educational attainment (measured as the number of years in full-time education)

5 We excluded 709 respondents who reported being born in their current country of residence, but not being citizens.
• Lives in an urban area (1=respondent lives in a big city, or suburbs or outskirts of a big city – see de Rooij; 0=otherwise)
• Speaks the national language at home as a first or second language (1=no, 0=yes)6

These biographical characteristics have previously been linked to overall political participation, although it is less clear theoretically and empirically how they might shape differential participation in specific types of action. McAdam (1986) and Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) showed that personal constraints make higher cost forms of participation, which typically require more commitment, less preferred. Employment and family commitments may therefore act as countervailing forces especially in extra-institutional forms of action. For similar reasons, it may not be surprising that younger people (especially students) are more likely to participate in high-cost, extra-institutional types of political action because they have fewer countervailing ties or “rigid commitments” (Schussman and Soule 2005). Employment has been thought to limit participation in extra-institutional activities because individuals who are employed are less likely to risk their jobs (McCarthy and Zald 1973) but again, findings are mixed (see Schussman and Soule 2005). Similarly, while scholars have shown that material and psychological resources provided through education and income increase participation in both institutional and extra-institutional forms of action (see Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; McVeigh and Smith 1999; Dalton 2002), the literature is less clear about how or why resources might shape differential participation in institutional and extra-institutional forms. And, there is some ambiguity about whether we should expect biographical availability and resources to shape immigrant participation differently than for natives (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Leighley 2001). Yet, it is likely that citizen and non-citizen immigrants’ position in the social and political structure shapes their biographical availability and resources, which in turn affect their political participation (Martinez 2005; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).7

6 Multiple possible national languages were accounted for in Belgium (Dutch and French), Switzerland (German, French, Italian, Romansh), Spain (Spanish and Catalan), the U.K. (English and Welsh), Ireland (English and Gaelic), and the Netherlands (Dutch and Frisian).
7 Immigrant citizens are generally demographically closer to non-citizens than they are to natives. Both immigrant groups are more likely to have children at home, to have a dependent partner, to be unemployed or to have been unemployed previously, to live in an urban area and not to speak the national language at home. As noted, these biographical factors may facilitate or inhibit immigrant groups from participating in certain kinds of political action (see Appendix Table A2).
Analyses and Results

Before examining the detailed patterns of participation based on the effects of covariates,8 we first estimated the percentage of each group who participated in any type of political action (any of the activities listed above). As expected, without accounting for any biographical differences, we found that both immigrant groups were substantially less likely to participate. 53.2% of natives reported having participated in at least one type of political action in the last 12 months, compared to 46.2% of immigrant citizens and 35.9% of immigrant non-citizens.

This overall distance is also clear from Figure 1, where we break down participation rates by specific activity. This figure shows that immigrants, and particularly non-citizens, tend to participate less across the board. Overall, the rates of participation by group across activities suggest that immigrant political participation in general does not follow a unique pattern compared to that of natives. Regardless of immigration status, people are most likely to engage in petition signing and boycotts – both of which can be considered low cost/risk forms of action. That is, people are more willing to not buy something, or to sign something. It may be that these types of actions are more appealing to all groups because individuals can engage in both types of activities only once, seeking to influence outcomes privately without necessarily requiring

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8 These and all subsequently reported figures are weighted by both the population and design weights provided by the ESS.
significant efforts in coordinating directly with others.\textsuperscript{9} Consistent with this, the activity that people (of all statuses) are least likely to engage in is working for a political party or political action group – an activity which may require significant effort and time investment, but which is not typically treated as extra-institutional or unconventional.

Comparing citizen and non-citizen immigrants, Figure 1 also shows that non-citizen immigrants are less likely to participate in protest demonstrations than immigrant citizens (immigrant citizens and natives seem to have roughly the same rate of participation in a demonstration). In fact, non-citizens participate in demonstrations at about the same rate as contacting a politician and wearing a campaign badge (immigrant citizens and natives also have similar rates when it comes to wearing a campaign badge). The patterns described in Figure 1 illustrate how grouping activities into institutional/uninstitutional produces misleading portraits of participation. These patterns do not point to any obvious distinctions in immigrant citizen, non-citizen and native participation based on this dichotomy. What both Table 1 and Figure 1 suggest is that what likely drives the rates for non-citizen participation in extra-institutional activities is including petitions and boycotts in that grouping. We argue both activities (but especially the former) are dubious examples of unconventionality.

\textit{Accounting for Biographical Factors}

Figure 2 shows predicted rates of participation in each type of activity after accounting for all of the covariates described above. These were derived from logistic regression models with fixed effects for country and ESS wave. These results show a very similar pattern to the unadjusted patterns described above. After accounting for biographical differences, non-citizen immigrants remain less likely than both natives and immigrant citizens to participate across the board, where the distances between citizens and non-citizens is particularly pronounced for petition signing and boycotts (although these are still the two activities in which non-citizens participate most relative to other activities). Non-citizen immigrants remain less likely than natives to participate in contacting politicians, working for other organizations, petition signing, and boycotts. In sum, all three groups participate least in working for a political party, wearing a badge and taking part in a demonstration, and most in petition signing.

\textsuperscript{9} Debates about whether boycotts and petitions are forms of collective action and their efficacy in influencing outcomes have surfaced in recent popular debates about “slacktivism” particularly in terms of online petition signing and consumer boycotts.
signing and boycotts. The data underlying Figure 2 (including confidence intervals) is provided in Table 2.

To explore these results further, Figure 3 plots the relative odds that immigrant citizens (versus natives) and non-citizens (versus natives) will participate in each form of political action (again, adjusting for covariates). Non-citizen immigrants are significantly less likely to work for a political party than both citizen immigrants and natives (see also Table 2) which may in part be explained by how disenfranchisement discourages long-term commitment to more highly “institutionalized” forms of political involvement. Non-citizen immigrants are also less likely than citizen immigrants to do other organizational work, wear a campaign badge, and sign a petition (all of which have been associated with the regular political and electoral process). The activity for which non-citizen participation most closely resembles that of immigrant citizens (and therefore natives) is joining a boycott (see Figure 3 and Table 2). This might be because boycotts require less coordination and can be done privately. It may also be the case that boycotts (especially consumer boycotts) are an indirect way to influence political outcomes and thus do not hinge on political inclusion, citizenship and voting rights.

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10 We also ran these analyses with the subset of participators only (that is, excluding those who never participated in any form of action) to account for possible qualitative differences between those who participated in some type of political action and those who never participated in any form of action (see Schussman and Soule 2005; Saunders, Grasso, Olcese et al. 2012). The results were not substantively different.
TABLE 2  Adjusted estimates and confidence intervals (in parentheses) by type of political participation and immigrant status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Immigrant citizens</th>
<th>Immigrant non-citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted pol</td>
<td>14.8 (14.53, 15.09)</td>
<td>11.1 (10.10, 12.18)</td>
<td>9.3 (8.16, 10.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party or PAG work</td>
<td>4.1 (3.92, 4.23)</td>
<td>4.1 (3.45, 4.85)</td>
<td>1.7 (1.25, 2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other org work</td>
<td>17.9 (17.65, 18.23)</td>
<td>14.1 (12.87, 15.24)</td>
<td>11.2 (9.95, 12.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badge</td>
<td>8 (7.80, 8.23)</td>
<td>8.3 (7.34, 9.23)</td>
<td>4.9 (4.05, 5.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>31 (30.64, 31.37)</td>
<td>24.6 (23.18, 26.08)</td>
<td>16.8 (15.34, 18.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>22.7 (22.34, 23.00)</td>
<td>18.7 (17.41, 20.00)</td>
<td>16.8 (15.22, 18.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demo</td>
<td>10.4 (10.12, 10.62)</td>
<td>10.5 (9.41, 11.56)</td>
<td>5.7 (4.87, 6.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any participation</td>
<td>53.4 (53.06, 53.84)</td>
<td>45 (43.20, 46.54)</td>
<td>36.6 (34.63, 38.51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relative odds displayed in Figure 3 suggest that compared to natives, immigrant citizens are less likely to participate in boycotts, petition signing, other organizational work, and contacting a politician by roughly the same margin. Formal comparisons of these coefficients (using Wald tests, see Appendix Table A3) show that, indeed, these odds ratios are not significantly different from each other. Note that the first two activities have previously been treated as “un-institutional” or “unconventional” while the latter two have not. Given
that immigrant citizens’ reduced likelihood to participate in these activities are about equal, it raises additional concerns about the a priori assignment of these types of action into categories as this masks other potential qualitative similarities between these types of action (i.e., level of commitment, duration, and availability of the tactic).

This concern is even more pronounced when comparing effect sizes for different types of participation between non-citizens and natives. Inspection of Figure 3 suggests that non-citizens’ lower participation rates relative to natives are substantially more marked for some activities than others. Figure 3 points to two main groups of political activity based on the size of the odds of participation. For the first group – comprising boycotts, badge wearing, other organizational work, and contacting a politician – non-citizen immigrants are somewhat less likely than natives (and immigrant citizens) to participate. For the second group – comprising petition signing and working for political party or action group – the difference from natives is more pronounced. Wald tests confirm that the odds ratios within these groups are not significantly different from each other and that the odds ratios for activities in the first group are all significantly different from the odds ratios for activities in the second group (see Appendix Table A3). Importantly, demonstrations do not appear to be neatly situated in either group of activities. Wald tests show that the effect of non-citizen immigrant status on participating in demonstrations is not statistically distinguishable from its effect on any of the other activities, with the exception of participating in a boycott.

Interestingly, when it comes to petition signing, the effect size for non-citizens compared to natives is not statistically different than for demonstrations or working for a political party, but is significantly different from boycotts, badge wearing, other org work, and contacting politicians. This again highlights the problems associated with categorizing these activities based on institutionality or conventionality. Also notable is the contrast in the way activities cluster (in terms of relative differences in the size of the odds of participation compared to natives) by immigrant status. For citizen immigrants, demonstrations, badge wearing, and working for a political party or action group are activities in which they are just as likely to participate as natives. Boycotts, petition signing, other organizational work and contacting a politician, on the other hand, are activities in which immigrant citizens are less likely to participate than natives. For non-citizen immigrants though, petition signing cannot be grouped together with boycotts or other organizational work, and working for a political party cannot be grouped with badge wearing based on the size of the odds of their participation across these types of political action.
We summarize our findings as follows. First, immigrants participate less than natives overall. Second, we find that individuals, regardless of status, appear to prefer activities that require less commitment and coordination (such as petitions and boycotts). All three groups participate least in working for a party, wearing a badge and demonstrations. Third, breaking down political participation into specific types of activity sheds light on preferences. Notably, non-citizen immigrants are less likely than citizen immigrants to participate in activities associated with the regular political/electoral process but are very similar in their participation in boycotts. Finally, comparing differences in the size of the effects by group across type of activity provides additional insight on patterns and preferences for political participation. For example, immigrant citizens participate less than natives in boycotts, petition-signing, organizational work and contacting a politician by the same magnitude. Whereas for non-citizen immigrants, boycotts and petition signing cannot be grouped together.

Our findings suggest that patterns of participation do not neatly coincide with the cost/risk and institutionality conceptualization of political activity. For instance, non-citizen immigrants and citizen immigrants tend to be similar in their preferences for contacting a politician – an institutional form of action that requires some political inclusion (such as the franchise), which non-citizens are less likely to have, in order to be effective.\textsuperscript{11} However immigrant citizens and non-citizens are significantly different when it comes to working for a party and wearing a campaign badge. Similarly, effect sizes for some activities typically treated as unconventional and others treated as conventional are not statistically different. These findings point to multiple dimensions shaping immigrant citizen and non-citizen preferences for political action. These include risk, commitment, duration and expectations for obtaining a desired outcome, which can in fact be shared by activities that are traditionally treated as distinct. Demonstrations and working for a political party may require similar levels of commitment over a period of time, while signing petitions and contacting a politician may require less commitment and can be of very limited duration.

\textsuperscript{11} Given that recent studies on immigrant participation (like de Rooij 2012) used only the first wave of the ESS to conduct their analyses (the first wave contained a more complete list of political activities than other ESS waves), we also re-ran our analyses using the first wave only. Our findings were quite similar to those based on all six ESS waves. Overall, immigrants are quite similar to natives in their preferences for types of political action, including protest demonstrations, while non-citizen immigrants again appear slightly more averse to working for a party or signing petitions.
Discussion and Conclusion

The recent literature on immigrant political participation has pointed to important mechanisms linking a variety of factors like biographical availability, social embeddedness and citizenship to political action. This growing body of work raises a key debate about whether “unique patterns” or mechanisms explain immigrant political participation (Leighley 2001; Klandermans, et al. 2008; de Rooij 2012). Existing theories of political participation and collective action suggest that the same considerations, processes and mechanisms apply to immigrant participation. Scholars noted that “There is nothing to distinguish the causes of ethnic collective action from the causes of any other kind” (Hechter, et al. 1982, 413) and that “… immigrant citizenship and political incorporation is a process akin to social movement mobilization, involving friends, family, ethnic organizations and local community leaders” (Bloemraad 2006, 668).

Some of our findings are consistent with certain theoretical and empirical expectations about immigrant and native participation. However, by unpacking forms of action and focusing on differences between groups in their participation patterns, our analyses raise conceptual and empirical questions about preferences for action. We claim that our results do not provide particularly compelling evidence that citizenship, by providing immigrants with necessary legal and psychosocial resources, acts as “a ticket” specifically to so-called extra-institutional participation. However, citizenship may act to bring immigrants into the political process of a given country by making available to them the extant variety of tactical repertoires. Immigrant citizens and non-citizens are most similar in their rates of participation in boycotts. They are most different in their rates of participation in petition-signing (although this is still the most preferred type of action for both groups), badge wearing, demonstrations, and working for a political party. Thus, citizenship may be a ticket to participation in everyday politics including a range of action that has been previously categorized as both institutional and un-institutional. Distinguishing between relative and absolute participation suggests that immigrant political action can be understood via existing theoretical frameworks pointing to how biographical as well as political and social movement contexts, mobilize actors into different forms of action.

We also highlighted certain problems associated with measuring and comparing political participation among immigrants and natives. The ways in which activities are traditionally grouped run the risk of conflating factors like cost, risk, effort and commitment that can shape why some individuals participate in some activities while others do not at all. These broad categories
group qualitatively different activities that vary widely in terms of the costs they impose and the effort they require to engage in them. And, this has important consequences on the conclusions we make about political participation. Categorizing petition signing alongside protest demonstrations as an extra-institutional activity can lead to dramatic overestimations in the overall amount of participation in what are treated as higher cost, unconventional activities, while simultaneously downplaying immigrant citizen and non-citizen preferences for activities associated with the everyday electoral or democratic process.

Our findings point to the importance of isolating more proximate variables explaining differences in participation rather than blending costs, risks and institutionality. Some political activities included in our analysis can be “one-shot” (such as petition-signing), thus requiring relatively short-term involvement and/or commitment (See McAdam 1986; Taylor and van Dyke 2004). Other institutional or conventional activities like working for a party or movement group require longer-term commitments. Additionally, individuals may participate in an extra-institutional form of action like a legal or illegal protest demonstration, which may require as much effort and commitment as working for a party if the protest event and the individual’s participation endures. But, an individual may briefly participate once in a protest event which may require as much commitment as signing a petition or contacting a politician.

Of course, large cross-national surveys rarely ask about the motivations or pretenses surrounding participation, making it difficult to assess how committed a participant is or whether one-time events or actions may be preferred by some groups over others. Unfortunately, as is the case with the majority of survey datasets employed in this literature, the ESS does not examine respondents’ motivations for engaging in political action. We are only able to determine that, for example, a given respondent has engaged in a protest demonstration, or has joined a political action group. We are unable to determine what specifically motivated an individual to act or what the activity specifically entailed. To take an extreme case, two respondents engaging in the same form of political action, could be on opposite sides of an issue, mobilized by different structures, where participation for one individual was recurring, and for the other a one-time event. Yet, they would look identical in the ESS data. This severely limits our ability to examine the role of differing grievances and mobilizing efforts contributing to immigrants’ preferences for different types of political action.

Our findings indicate that by and large, immigrant preferences are stronger for one-shot activities that may be coordinated (although not necessarily) but acted on privately over activities that are more public requiring organization,
more extensive coordination and longer term commitments. In addition to biographical availability, this may be because their fragile status makes non-citizens wary about public displays of dissatisfaction or about identifying with certain causes. It may also be the case that the political issues motivating immigrants and non-citizen immigrants are lower profile, lacking a prominent place in a political campaign and/or policy agenda. These issues may not generate the kind of collective action and public interest other issues might. This can shape preferences for certain tactics like contacting a politician or boycotting products which may not require a lot of coordination, can be done privately, and can be highly directed at issues at the local, national, and international levels (such as boycotting products associated with a political regime). Indeed, boycotts are adaptable to the availability of individual and group resources. Organized recruitment and mobilization of immigrant communities by political campaigns, movement groups, church organizations and labor unions may also increase immigrants’ preferences and likelihood for participation in certain kinds of activities within political, institutional and cultural contexts specific to the countries within which political participation takes place.

Scholars of political institutions and political participation have pointed to national governing and class structures in shaping opportunities for when, how and why political action takes place (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1992; Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996; Lijphart 1999). In their cross-national study of political participation, Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young (2011) found that country-level political-institutional factors like electoral self-determination, democratic consolidation and women’s political representation shape individual preferences for different forms of action. A basic comparative analysis of our country-level data shows that there is substantial cross-national variation in the differences between non-citizen immigrants, immigrants and natives in their political participation. Controlling for all individual-level covariates, the participation rates of immigrants in most activities, relative to natives, are generally most depressed in Germany, Finland and Spain. Notably, there are also some countries where immigrant citizens are more likely than natives to participate in certain political activities. For example, in France and Portugal, immigrant citizens are significantly more likely than natives to have done work for a political party or action group; in Ireland they are significantly more likely than natives to sign petitions; and in Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, they are significantly more likely to participate in public demonstrations.

Thus, national contexts are likely to matter in explaining immigrant and non-citizen immigrant participation. Political marginalization and exclusion as well as anti-immigrant political rhetoric can mobilize immigrants into more disruptive forms of action. In addition, it may be the case that grievances
unique to immigrants, combined with exclusion from conventional political channels, shape their preferences for some types of actions over others. Strong state responses on the issue of integration have produced remarkable episodes of mass participation in collective action by both immigrant citizens and non-citizens. Many immigrant groups in Europe, for example immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, suffer both high levels of discrimination and political and social exclusion within their “host” countries (Klandermans et al. 2008). It may be the case that Muslim immigrants and non-citizen immigrants in some countries show increasing preferences for more costly, disruptive forms of political action. A full formal and systematic analysis of national differences is beyond the scope of this study. However, future research should explore how national political and social institutions shape individual-level preferences across groups for different types of political action.

As it becomes increasingly clear that immigrants and non-citizen immigrants participate in a variety of political action, future comparative work should shed light on the processes involved in shaping preferences for certain types of action. This will likely involve the use of alternative cross-national data sources more suited to a close examination of the motivations behind immigrant political action. Immigrants “will constitute some of the major protest movements of the future in many Western countries” (Klandermans, et al. 2008, 1009). This makes it particularly important to understand how and why immigrants and non-citizens become more committed to participation in potentially confrontational and disruptive forms of action, as well as why they do not.

To do this, scholars should further investigate whether and how biographical and institutional factors differentially shape patterns of participation in different forms of action across groups. When it comes to immigrant political participation, individual-level factors like education, income and social ties, which are thought to provide material and psychological resources necessary for participation, are inherently a product of immigrants’ position vis-à-vis social and political structures. The extent of their exclusion shapes the kinds of resources at their disposal. Not surprisingly, scholars interested in explaining immigrant political participation and mobilization have thought of citizenship as a means to gain access to institutions and resources which in turn shape political preferences and behaviors (See Ebert and Okamota 2013 for recent work on citizenship and political inclusion). The literature is less clear about whether increasing access to social and political institutions increases or decreases participation in short or long term, public or private, high or low cost and confrontational or non-confrontational political action. In order to address this and the other theoretical ambiguities mentioned in our paper, it is
important that future cross-national work investigates the link between access to political and social institutions and immigrants’ perceptions of the efficacy of different forms of action relative to their expectations about the outcomes of their political participation.

References


# Appendix

## Table A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Citizen immigrants</th>
<th>Non-citizen immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>89.87</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>79.63</td>
<td>8.57</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>90.03</td>
<td>6.11</td>
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<td>94.04</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>ES</td>
<td>91.51</td>
<td>2.53</td>
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<td>FI</td>
<td>96.92</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
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<td>GB</td>
<td>88.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>NL</td>
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<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>88.82</td>
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<td>2.93</td>
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</table>

## Table A2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Immigrant citizens</th>
<th>Immigrant non-citizens</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>47.20</td>
<td>46.91</td>
<td>39.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD=18.60)</td>
<td>(SD=17.20)</td>
<td>(SD=14.70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% male</td>
<td>48.09</td>
<td>48.35</td>
<td>47.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% single</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>33.19</td>
<td>33.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with children at home</td>
<td>37.66</td>
<td>47.81</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with dependent partner</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>19.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in full-time education</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>9.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% currently unemployed</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>12.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ever been long-term unemployed</td>
<td>26.69</td>
<td>33.22</td>
<td>36.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median years of education</td>
<td>12.51</td>
<td>12.87</td>
<td>12.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>(SD=4.14)</td>
<td>(SD=4.37)</td>
<td>(SD=4.75)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% living in urban area</td>
<td>28.89</td>
<td>41.87</td>
<td>43.61</td>
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Table A2  Descriptive statistics (cont.)

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<tr>
<th>% not speaking national language at home</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.37</td>
<td>45.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Christian</td>
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<td>43.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Muslim</td>
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<td>% Other religion</td>
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<td>% No religion</td>
<td>47.81</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>140,495</td>
<td>7,929</td>
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Table A3  Pairwise comparison of coefficients for citizen and non-citizen immigrant participation relative to natives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Demonstration</th>
<th>Boycott</th>
<th>Petition</th>
<th>Badge</th>
<th>Other org work</th>
<th>Party or PAG work</th>
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Note: Results from Wald tests comparing coefficients for the effect of immigration status on each activity: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, nd = coefficients are not significantly different; Natives are comparison group.