Perceptions of Structural Injustice and Efficacy: Participation in Low/Moderate/High-Cost Forms of Collective Action*

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Prior studies on perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice, efficacy, and collective action have suffered from two major limitations: (1) they have used single-country samples, usually of economically advanced countries, and (2) generally theorized and investigated perceptions of structural injustice and efficacy separately. Drawing on value-expectancy theory, we provide an integrated theory to predict direct and conditional effects of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice on collective action within countries. To address the limitations of previous research, we use cross-national data of 29 countries, including economically advanced and less advanced nations, to test how well these hypotheses explain within-country variation in collective action. We find that internal efficacy is significantly and positively associated with low- and moderate-cost collective action, whereas organizational embeddedness, a proxy for political efficacy, is significantly and positively associated with low-, moderate-, and high-cost collective action. Perceptions of legitimate and unjust structural disadvantage are also positively associated with all types of collective action. Importantly, the positive effects of both types of efficacy on high-cost collective action are conditional on perceptions of structural injustice. That is, participation in high-cost collective action is more likely for those who are both efficacious and perceive structural disadvantage as unjust.

Introduction

In recent years, inequality has become increasingly discussed in academia, the media, and the government generating much public debate on the matter. Its increasing issue salience can be attributed to political mobilization and activism at multiple levels. Political and business leaders have echoed the call of the Occupy or 99 percent movement declaring a “war on inequality.” The Marmot Review (2010) and Pickett and Wilkinson’s The Spirit Level (2011), which linked a variety of social and health problems to excessive inequality, have received much attention from the media and policymakers. This emerging focus not only highlighted the structural causes of inequality but also the consequences of it. Elites and activists have raised political and public awareness of injustice and structural inequality in the United States and around the world.
But, as sociologist Leslie McCall (New York Times 2011) suggests, Americans have always been aware of inequality and tend to find most forms of it problematic and unjust. The same is true across Europe from the U.K. to Bulgaria.

Inequality has long been recognized as an important issue by European countries with major social democratic, socialist, and communist parties implementing policies designed to reduce it, such as “progressive taxation [...] via the welfare state” in social democracies (Giddens 1998:10). Notably, “the pursuit of equality has been a major concern of all social democrats, including the British Labour Party” (Giddens 1998:10). Although the rise of neoliberalism in the mid-1970s contributed to increased inequality in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, most countries in Continental Europe maintained social democracies with commitments to equality (Giddens 1998). Thus, recent activism and political participation have likely brought these longstanding concerns about social inequality and injustice to the forefront by activating deep-seated, and previously unfocused, grievances.

A primary objective in the study of political participation, collective action, and social movements is to understand what factors can account for differential participation in collective action (see Opp 2010). Approaches within the “social psychology of mobilization” (Ennis and Schreuer 1987) tend to investigate “why” individuals come to participate in collective action by focusing on collective action frames, identity, emotions, and efficacy (Klandermans 1984; Passy and Giugni 2001; Snow et al. 1986). Two key social psychological predictors of collective action, hereafter CA, are perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice and efficacy, although they are rooted in different theoretical traditions. From an instrumental perspective, value-expectancy theory (VET) emphasizes an individual’s belief that he/she can create change and achieve a valued outcome, that is, a sense of efficacy (Klandermans 1984). From a more affective perspective, stemming from relative deprivation theory (RDT), perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice are predicted to lead to CA when people view disadvantage as rooted in societal structures that are unjust (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Research on the social psychology of mobilization tends to view these as distinct explanations (see van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008 and van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012 for notable exceptions).

This article draws on VET to theoretically integrate the role of perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice with efficacy to explain differential participation in CA. VET proposes that one’s motivation to engage in CA is the product of efficacy and the perceived value of the collective good. We suggest that the latter depends on whether disadvantage is perceived to be rooted in societal structures that not only can be changed through CA, but that need to be changed due to their unjustness. This allows explanations focused on the
perceptions of structural disadvantage to be integrated with efficacy explanations using VET. We predict that both efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage will increase CA with perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage having a stronger positive effect on CA. Our integrated theoretical framework also allows us to theorize a moderating effect between efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage. Drawing on VET and social movement research on “cognitive liberation” (Gamson 1995, 2011; McAdam 1982), we propose that highly efficacious individuals will be more likely to engage in CA when they perceive disadvantage as rooted in societal structures, especially ones that are viewed as unjust. We expect this moderating effect for high-cost CA where higher levels of motivation are necessary to outweigh the costs of participation.

Most research on efficacy and/or injustice and CA has been confined geographically to single countries such as the United States (for exceptions see Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2011), or to small samples (see van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008 for example). The majority of studies outside of the United States draw data from Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands (e.g., Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Sturmer and Simon 2004; see Gamson 2011 for an exception). These studies have provided evidence for the positive effect of efficacy and injustice on CA, particularly in economically advanced countries. We extend these studies by using a larger sample of 29 countries that also includes less economically advanced countries and post-Soviet states. By using general measures of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage (i.e., not country, movement, or action specific), we are able to test our hypotheses cross-nationally using larger samples of individuals both within and outside particular movements. Evidence for our hypotheses would lend support to a general social psychological explanation of the combined role of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice in CA and its cross-national generalizability across varied country contexts.

**Value-Expectancy Theory and Efficacy**

From an instrumental perspective, VET claims that an individual will evaluate whether participation is worth the effort given the individual’s expectations of the success or failure of the action weighted against the costs of participating (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Klandermans 1984). There are three types of expectations: an individual’s expectations of (1) his/her own contribution to the success/failure of the action, (2) the expected number of participants, and (3) the likelihood of success if many other people participate (Klandermans 1984). These additively combined expectations are multiplied by the perceived value of the outcome and then added to the costs and benefits of participation (or
non-participation), which determines whether it is worth the effort to participate (Klandermans 1984). There must be a perception that there is a real likelihood that the action will be successful (i.e., efficacious beliefs) for someone to participate. Efficacy, therefore, is an important predictor of participation in CA (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2011; Ennis and Schreuer 1987; Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Klandermans 1984; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; Passy and Giugni 2001; Piven and Cloward 1977; Sherkat and Blocker 1994; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008).

Two distinct understandings of efficacy are found in the literature: (1) internal or personal efficacy and (2) group or collective efficacy. The former emphasizes whether individuals believe they can influence outcomes (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989), which falls under the first type of expectation regarding one’s own contribution to the success of the CA. The latter refers to group members’ perceptions of whether their group, often a social movement organization (SMO), can achieve desired ends through the use of CA (Evans 1997; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). This form of efficacy generally relates to the second and third types of expectation as they both deal with expectations regarding the contributions of others to the success of the CA. Studies have found that both types of efficacy affect CA, although most studies investigate them separately (Lee 2010). This study investigates participation in CA for both SMO members and non-members. Because non-members may not have a particular reference for collective efficacy, we focus on personal or internal efficacy, which cuts across SMO members and non-members.

Internal efficacy has its roots in Rotter (1954, 1966), who originated the term “internal locus of control” to refer to individuals who exhibit behavior (including political behavior) that is outwardly directed. Individuals with an internal locus of control are efficacious because they perceive change as coming primarily from their own actions. In contrast, those who have a “high external locus of control” are fatalistic, believing that powerful others or forces determine life events. Thus, efficacy/fatalism is classically conceptualized as a continuum of perceived control where on one end, an individual is efficacious and believes that he/she “can shape conditions and events in [. . . ] his/her life” and at the other end, an individual is fatalistic and believes “that [. . . ] his/her actions cannot influence events and circumstances (Mirowsky and Ross 2003:174).” Efficacy and fatalism are global judgments regarding how much control individuals believe they have over their own life and environment and are not particular to any one domain; as such, they are predicted to affect many, if not all, spheres of one’s life by raising or lowering the perceived probability that a given action will achieve a desired outcome.

As a global judgment, efficacy has been extensively applied to political engagement. This research generally predicts that “the less fatalistic people are...
the more inclined they should be to think that there will be some payoff from political involvement and participation (Sherrill and Vogler 1982).” Fatalistic individuals tend to withdraw from political life and are therefore less likely to participate in any politically motivated behavior, including CA (Andrain and Smith 2006; Ellis 1993; Sherrill and Vogler 1982). In particular, Rotter (1954) found that civil rights activists were more likely to be efficacious. Since his study, there has been a large volume of research on the effects of general efficacy on CA (for a review of 20 years’ worth of research on this topic, see Klandermans 1983). We hypothesize that: H1: The more internally efficacious an individual is, the more likely he/she will be to participate in CA.

Some definitions of internal efficacy have deviated from the more classical or “global judgment” understanding (Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Rotter 1954, 1966) toward domain-specific political efficacy (Corning and Myers 2002). Political efficacy refers to a sense that one’s actions will be effective when participating in the political domain, including CA (Corning and Myers 2002; Ennis and Schreuer 1987; Roefs, Klandermans, and Olivier 1998). Several studies have found that political efficacy is higher among individuals who participate in voluntary associations (Almond and Verba 1965; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McClurg 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001). This is due in part to talking about politics more often within the organizations in which they are embedded, thereby learning how the political system works (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; McClurg 2003). Although the data we draw on do not have a direct measure of political efficacy, because of the relationship between it and participation in voluntary associations, we use organizational embeddedness as a proxy. We hypothesize that: H2: The more organizationally embedded an individual is, the more likely he/she will be to participate in CA.

Although there has been a great deal of research on efficacy and CA, it tends to preclude another important factor affecting CA: perceptions of structural disadvantage.

**Integrating Perceptions of Legitimate and Unjust Structural Disadvantage with VET**

Perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice are also key social psychological predictors of CA rooted in RDT. RDT emphasizes how subjective perceptions of disadvantage arise from making social comparisons with specific others (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Perceptions of disadvantage alone are not sufficient for prompting participation in CA though, since disadvantage can be perceived to be rooted in the individual. If people blame themselves for their disadvantage, then there is no reason to participate in CA as it will not change the disadvantage (Ellemers and Barreto 2009; Kawakami
and Dion 1995). On the other hand, if they blame society or structural factors for disadvantage, then CA becomes a possible method of rectifying the disadvantage (Oberschall 1973). Because structural disadvantage may be viewed as legitimate or just, CA will be more likely to occur when there is a subjective sense of injustice that facilitates action to redress said injustice (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). RDT proposes that perceptions of societal injustice evoke emotional arousal (Kawakami and Dion 1995), such as anger or shame, which then motivates participation in CA (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008).

While perceptions of structural disadvantage continue to be explored through the lens of RDT within social psychological studies of CA (see Smith and Kessler 2004 for a review), social movement research has long recognized the participation of individuals or groups who do not stand to directly benefit from the achievement of social movement goals (i.e., “conscience adherents”) (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Studies show that individuals can perceive the structural disadvantage of others even when they do not experience it (Arsenault 2006; McAdam 1982). Moreover, research on CA frames highlights how individuals can have perceptions of societal injustice, even if they are not the objects of the injustice, and that these perceptions can facilitate mobilization (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Morris and Braine 2001). RDT is therefore inadequate for explaining the effects of perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice on participation in CA as it cannot account for the participation of individuals who are not directly disadvantaged.

We propose that VET provides an encompassing theoretical framework for predicting the effects of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage on participation in CA. See Figure 1 for a causal diagram of our adaptation of the theory. According to VET, one’s willingness to participate in CA is partly explained by the multiplicative effect of efficacy and the perceived value of the collective good (Klandermans 1984). The latter is the product of the instrumentality and value of the social changes sought. If individuals do not believe that CA will bring about valued societal changes, then they will not value the collective good resulting from CA. At the same time, if they believe that CA will be instrumental for bringing about societal changes but do not value those changes, then they will also not value the collective good. Because the instrumentality and value of the social changes sought combine in a multiplicative way, if either is perceived to be zero, then the perceived value of the collective good is also zero. Individuals will only perceive the instrumentality of expected social change and value it if they view the disadvantage as structural. Klandermans (1983:407) alludes to this when he states that “individuals can only expect social change to remove discontent if they blame their discontent on shortcomings of society […] without this conception the
outcomes of socio-political action would have no value for a person.”
Following from this line of argument, if individuals do not blame society for
the disadvantage, but rather fate, luck, or personal characteristics, they will not
expect CA to eliminate it (i.e., zero instrumentality of social change) (Klandermans 1983). Given this, we predict that individuals who attribute disadvantage
to structural factors will be more likely to participate in CA relative to those
who attribute it to individual factors, regardless of whether they are or were
disadvantaged themselves. Thus, we hypothesize: H3: Individuals who perceive
disadvantage to be rooted in societal structures will be more likely to
participate in CA than individuals who perceive it as rooted in individual
characteristics.

Perceiving structural disadvantage is necessary for there to be a nonzero
value for the instrumentality of social change, but if structural disadvantage is
perceived to be legitimate or fair, then the value of the social change can still be
zero (Klandermans 1983; Roefs, Klandermans, and Olivier 1998). When struc-
tural disadvantage is also perceived to be unjust, feelings of anger, frustration, or
moral indignation may further increase the value of expected social change (see
Gamson 1995 and Morris and Braine 2001 on injustice frames). In this case, per-
ceptions of structural/societal injustice (i.e., structural disadvantage perceived to
be unfair or illegitimate) provide a strong “reason for non-compliance” in pursuit
of desired social change (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982: 123). Given this,
we predict that the effect of structural disadvantage on CA will be stronger for those who perceive it as unjust. This leads to the following hypothesis: H4: Individuals who perceive disadvantage to be rooted in unjust societal structures will be more likely to participate in CA than those who perceive disadvantage to be rooted in legitimate societal structures.

The Conditional Relationship between Efficacy and Injustice in Explaining High-Cost CA

Social psychological work on CA does not consider the relationship between efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice (see van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008 and van Zomeren, Leach, and Spears 2012 for notable exceptions), particularly moderating relationships. On the other hand, the social movement literature does not make a sharp distinction between the two concepts instead alluding to their conditional effects on CA. McAdam (1982) argued that without seeing something as changeable and without recognizing that there is an injustice caused by something external to the person, individuals cannot be mobilized. As Piven and Cloward (1977) succinctly put it, in order for CA to occur, the system must be perceived as unjust and citizens must no longer see existing arrangements as inevitable (i.e., they feel efficacious). They describe this state as the result of a set of stages that transform individuals’ consciousness and consequently their behavior. The first stage is coming to view the system as unjust and wrong; the second stage occurs when fatalistic individuals no longer view the existing arrangements as inevitable. Third, and finally, “there is a new sense of efficacy; people who ordinarily consider themselves helpless come to believe that they have some capacity to alter their lot” (Piven and Cloward 1977:3–4). McAdam (1982) refers to this as “cognitive liberation,” that is, overcoming mass resignation and seeing the possibility of change (see also Snow et al. 1986). Recently, Gamson (2011) criticized the notion that perceptions of injustice and efficacy necessarily occur in separate stages within the same process of cognitive liberation. Instead, he argued that the emergence of perceptions of injustice and efficacy is distinct and simultaneous processes influenced by internal and external factors.

Whether efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice occur stage-wise or simultaneously, all of these approaches implicitly propose a conditional relationship between the two factors. In Piven and Cloward’s (1977) and McAdam’s (1982) stage-wise conceptualizations of cognitive liberation, one does not achieve the final stage of mobilization without first passing through the previous two stages (i.e., perceptions of structural injustice and efficacy). In Gamson’s (2011) formulation, although perceptions of structural injustice and efficacy arise through separate simultaneous processes, both are
necessary for CA. Yet, neither approach provides a unifying theory supporting this conditional relationship.

We argue that VET provides a theoretical framework that allows us to integrate social psychological research on efficacy and perceptions of societal injustice to derive the conditional relationship suggested by social movement research. As mentioned above, an individual’s motivation to mobilize is in part the product of how much she values the collective good, which depends on her perceptions of structural disadvantage, both legitimate and unjust, and her level of efficacy. This specifies a conditional relationship whereby if either variable is zero, neither factor contributes to the willingness to participate in collective action. But, if both variables have positive values of 1 or higher, then they will amplify the effect of each other. As Klandermans (1983:407) notes, efficacy should “predict action-taking when the person holds the system or powerful others responsible for his discontent.” In this way, we predict an interaction effect between efficacy and the value of the good (i.e., perceptions of structural disadvantage).

Taking into consideration the conditional effects of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage on participation in CA also sheds important light on the obstacles individuals must overcome given the differential costs associated with various types of political activities. Past research on cognitive liberation neglected to consider how the conditional effect of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage might be affected by these costs. According to VET, the net costs of participation are subtracted from one’s motivation to participate (i.e., the level of efficacy multiplied by the value of the good) in determining the likelihood of participating in CA (Klandermans 1984). This means if the net costs of participation are higher than one’s motivation to participate, then individuals will be less likely to participate, all else being equal. Generally then, motivation to participate must be higher than the net costs of participation. When costs are low, less motivation is needed and efficacy or valuing the good may on their own lead to participation. As costs increase, more motivation is needed to outweigh those costs and thus, efficacy and valuing the good should be less likely to facilitate participation on their own and more likely to facilitate it due to their combined multiplicative effect. A simple example illustrates this. Let’s assume that efficacy, the value of the good, and the costs of participation all have possible values ranging from 0 (none) to 1 (low) to 5 (high). When efficacy is high—5, the value of the good low—1, and the costs of participation low—1, efficacy on its own should increase the likelihood of participating in CA. As the costs increase to 3, high efficacy should still have a positive effect on its own; however, as the costs become high—5, high efficacy is no longer sufficient as its positive effect is now equivalent to the negative effect of the costs. However, as the value of the good increases,
the multiplicative effect of efficacy and the value of the good is enough to increase the likelihood of engaging in CA even when the costs of participation are high. Thus, we expect to find a positive interaction effect between efficacy and the value of the good when the costs of participation are higher.

While there are many possible ways to measure the costs of participation, Klandermans (1984:588) identifies that “to a large extent the costs and benefits of participation” are bound up in the type of action, “from moderate to militant.” Because “different costs and benefits are associated with participation in different types of action” (Klandermans 1984:595), we separate types of CA into low-, moderate-, and high-cost (see Wiltfang and McAdam 1991 for distinctions between low- and high-cost CA). Examples of low-cost CA include signing a petition or joining a boycott, which do not require a lot of time or resources. High-cost CA, such as strikes and riots, require more time and resources and may lead to arrest or injury. Moderate-cost CA, such as lawful demonstrations, are somewhere in between low- and high-cost forms of CA in that they take more time and effort than low-cost actions but typically require less risk than high-cost actions. Given this specification of costs, we predict an interaction effect between efficacy and the value of the good (i.e., perceptions of structural disadvantage) when predicting participation in high-cost CA: H5: The positive effect of efficacy on participation in high-cost CA will be stronger for individuals who perceive disadvantage to be rooted in societal structures than for individuals who perceive it to be rooted in individual characteristics.

Since we argue that perceptions of structural disadvantage attributed to injustice increase the value of expected social changes more so than structural disadvantage not viewed as unjust (see H4), we also predict that the conditional effect of efficacy will be stronger when the value of the good is measured by perceptions of unjust, rather than legitimate, structural disadvantage. H6: The positive effect of efficacy on participation in high-cost CA will be stronger for individuals who perceive disadvantage to be rooted in unjust societal structures than for individuals who perceive disadvantage to be rooted in legitimate societal structures.

While Figure 1 presents our extensions of Klandermans (1984) original value-expectancy model of CA, Figure 2 provides a simplified version of it, highlighting the parts of the theoretical model we will be testing empirically. As identified above, perceptions of structural disadvantage affect the value of social change advocated and the instrumentality of the collective good for social change. This in turn affects the perceived value of the collective good, which moderates the effect of efficacy and vice versa. Given this, we can reduce the model to two independent variables—perceptions of structural disadvantage and efficacy. Moreover, in this model, the costs are dependent on the type of CA and thus become the outcome variable. This is akin to
Klandermans (1984) investigating the different effects of his predictors on moderate versus militant action. Figure 2 shows our theoretical expectations that efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage should both have direct effects on all three types of CA, but should only have a moderating effect for high-cost CA.

**Figure 2 A Simplified Model of Participation in Collective Action**

Data and Methods

**Sample**

We draw data from the fourth wave (1999–2004) of the World Values Survey (WVS) for 29 countries with a sample of 22,388 respondents. The WVS is a non-profit organization consisting of “a global network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life, led by an international team of scholars” (World Values Survey). The WVS is comprised of nationally representative surveys of randomly selected adults (18 years and older) in almost 100 countries across all waves. To achieve a nationally representative sample, stratified random sampling is used. In each country, a minimum sample of 1,000 people are interviewed in person, or by phone for remote areas. The questionnaire is originally developed in English and then translated into national languages. To verify accuracy, the questionnaire is then translated back into English and in many cases questions are
pretested to ensure there are no translation issues. Funding for the surveys comes primarily through Principal Investigators in each country raising the appropriate funds. However, in developing countries where this is not possible, funds have been received from a variety of partners including international development agencies, government ministries, non-profit foundations, and scientific organizations (see World Values Survey). The WVS contains rich biographical information on individual attitudes and values in addition to individual behavior measures, such as CA. All questions used in this study were asked of all respondents in the 29 countries. Although the WVS was designed to compare individual attitudes across countries, the data are biased toward developed nations and should be generalized with caution.

**Dependent Variables**

**Participation in CA.** van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) note that “collective actions do not necessarily require actual collectives. What matters is the aim of the action—to change the status of a group—rather than the number of people who are participating (p. 646).” CA thus encapsulates large-scale protests as well as micro-level actions, including signing a petition and participating in a boycott (van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). Thus, to measure CA, we created variables from questions asking the respondent whether he/she has ever (1) signed a petition, (2) joined a boycott, (3) attended lawful demonstrations, (4) joined unofficial strikes, or (5) occupied buildings or factories. We created three binary measures for low-cost, moderate-cost, and high-cost CA. For the low-cost CA measure, respondents who reported engaging in signing a petition or joining a boycott received a value of 1 otherwise a value of 0. For the moderate-cost CA measure, respondents who reported participating in a lawful demonstration received a value of 1 otherwise a value of 0. For the high-cost CA measure, respondents who reported engaging in unofficial strikes or occupying buildings or factories received a value of 1 otherwise a value of 0. It is important to note that these categories are not mutually exclusive, respondents can receive a value of 1 for all, some, or none of these measures.

**Independent Variables**

**Efficacy.** We measure internal efficacy using an item asking respondents how much freedom of choice and control they have in their lives (ordinal scale from 1 = none at all to 10 where 10 = a great deal). Lower levels refer to fatalistic people that “feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them,” whereas higher levels refer to efficacious people who feel they have complete “free choice and control over their lives.” This question has been used extensively as a measure of internal efficacy or locus of control (e.g., Sastry and Ross 1998; Verme 2009; Welzel and Inglehart 2010) and has
external validity (Sastry and Ross 1998). Importantly, it captures general efficacy as used in many prior VET studies (Klandermans 1983) and also sentiments of “mass resignation” as described by Piven and Cloward (1977) and McAdam (1982).

When a rating scale has many categories (particularly over 7), “respondents may fail to distinguish reliably between adjacent categories” (Groves et al. 2009:239; Krosnick and Fabrigar 1997). Labeling only the endpoints of responses rather than every response produces similar issues (Krosnick and Berent 1993). Thus, individuals with the same level of efficacy may perceive the 10-point scale differently and thus respond with slightly divergent values, such as choosing an 8 versus a 9. It is conventional in studies with self-reported physiological and psychological health-scale variables to dichotomize the measures based on low/high or agree/disagree values in order to reduce measurement error and facilitate interpretation (Manor, Matthews, and Power 2000; Quesnel-Vallée et al. 2005). Because the efficacy scale labeled the two endpoint values, responses can be dichotomized into values in the lower half of the scale, those closest to “none at all,” and values in the upper half of the scale, those closer to “a great deal.” This makes comparisons between these two groupings less biased than comparisons across the actual values. Given this, we create a binary internal efficacy measure where responses from 1 to 5 receive a value of 0 (fatalism) and responses from 6 to 10 receive a value of 1 (efficacy).

There is an immense and established body of research finding strong significant positive relationships between organizational embeddedness/affiliations and political efficacy net of relevant control variables (Almond and Verba 1965; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McClurg 2003; Passy and Giugni 2001; Wandersman and Florin 2000; Zimmerman 1989). Participation in organizations increases an individual’s civic knowledge and skills, which in turn increases their feelings of political efficacy (Almond and Verba 1965; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; McClurg 2003; Wandersman and Florin 2000). Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008) find that organizational embeddedness and political efficacy mediate each other’s effects on CA. Given the large body of work finding a positive relationship between organizational embeddedness and political efficacy, we use the former as a proxy for the latter. Following Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg (2008) and Schussman and Soule (2005), we operationalize organizational embeddedness as the number of organizational ties based on how many types of organizations with which a respondent is affiliated (see also Kitts 1999).

Perceptions of Legitimate and Unjust Structural Disadvantage. To measure perceptions of structural disadvantage, we use the question: “Why are
there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be the most important?” Respondents were provided with five possible responses: (1) because they are unlucky, (2) because of laziness or lack of willpower, (3) because of injustice in our society, (4) it’s an inevitable part of modern progress, and (5) none of these. “Modern progress” and “injustice in society” are both structural explanations for disadvantage, but the latter is also a measure of perceptions of structural injustice (see Bobbio, Canova, and Manganelli 2010 and Halman and Nevitte 1996). Since we are interested in whether perceptions of structural injustice have a stronger effect on CA than other structural explanations, we create binary measures for “modern progress” and “injustice in society.” Because both are structural explanations of disadvantage, we refer to the former as perceptions of legitimate structural disadvantage and the latter as perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage (or perceptions of structural/societal injustice). Individuals who responded with “unlucky” or “laziness or lack of willpower” were combined into an individual disadvantage measure where a value of 1 refers to respondents who chose one of these answers and 0 otherwise. Because a response of “none of these” cannot be placed into either category, we left it as its own binary measure. We use individual disadvantage as the referent category as it captures viewing inequality as rooted in individual characteristics.

Although this question captures explanations for a particular type of inequality—poverty—it has been used as a measure of public perceptions regarding why inequality exists more generally (Bobbio, Canova, and Manganelli 2010; Sefton 2009). Still the focus on economic inequality is a limitation of the measure. Since the WVS does not include information on the issues surrounding respondents’ participation in CA, we are unable to separate CA around economic issues from non-economic issues. Since our measures of perceptions of legitimate and unjust structural disadvantage only capture economic inequality, it may not predict non-economic CA. A more general measure might explain more variation in CA. If this is the case, then our measure would produce more conservative estimates as it would only explain a portion of participation in CA.

Control Variables

We control for several variables predicted by past research to affect CA. Biographical characteristics include the respondent’s age (measured in years), gender (1 = male), marital status (1 = married), children (1 = has 1 or more children), education level (ranging from 1 = did not complete elementary education to 8 = university degree), income (measured by the decile of their income with respect to their country of residence), and employment status.
Because age may have a nonlinear relationship with CA (i.e., as individuals age they may become less physically able to participate), we control for age-squared. We also control for how much time the respondent spends with colleagues and with friends (1 = not at all to 4 = weekly) (see Kitts 1999), and their self-positioning on an ordinal political scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right) (see Schussman and Soule 2005), which was dichotomized such that values from 1 to 5 became 1, and values from 6 to 10 became 0 (1 = left, 0 = right). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.

Analysis

The data are structured into two hierarchical levels: Individuals (level 1) embedded within countries (level 2). This structure is problematic for standard linear or logistic regression models because the responses of individuals within the same country are likely correlated, which results in the underestimation of standard errors. Overall, hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM), used to model binary and other non-continuous dependent variables, accurately estimates standard errors of clustered cases within larger units (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Since we measure CA with binary variables, we use a two-level hierarchical logistic regression and estimate models with xtmelogit in STATA 10 (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

In multilevel models, level-1 characteristics explain within-unit variation in the dependent variable, whereas level-2 characteristics explain cross-unit variation in the dependent variable. Because we are only interested in explaining differential participation within countries, we do not include country-level characteristics in our model. However, it is important to note that the HGLM models accurately estimate standard errors for correlated cases (i.e., individuals within countries), and therefore, their estimates and standard errors are not biased. We use log likelihood ratio tests to determine whether the addition of our independent variables to base models significantly improve model fit.

Results

Table 2 shows the HGLM models predicting low-cost, moderate-cost, and high-cost CA. Since the dependent variables are binary measures, we report odds ratios for these models. Odds ratios significantly above 1 represent a positive effect on CA and odds ratios significantly below 1 represent a negative effect on collective action.

Models 1, 2, and 3 present the direct effect models for each type of CA, respectively. In terms of the control variables, education, income, time spent with colleagues, and time spent with friends are all significantly and positively associated with low- and moderate-cost CA (Models 1 and 2), but not high-cost (Model 3). Men and unmarried individuals are more likely to engage in moderate-
Table 1
Variable Specifications and Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective Action</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-cost</td>
<td>Binary measure of whether the respondent signed a petition or joined a boycott</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate-cost</td>
<td>Binary measure of whether the respondent took part in a lawful demonstration</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-cost</td>
<td>Binary measure of whether the respondent took part in a strike and/or occupied a building</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>How much freedom of choice/control (1 = efficacious, 0 = fatalistic)</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org. Embeddedness</td>
<td>Count measure of the number of organizations for which the respondent is a member</td>
<td>1.151</td>
<td>1.552</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for Inequality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazy</td>
<td>People are living in need because they are lazy (1 = agree, 0 = not indicated); Referent Category</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Injustice</td>
<td>People are living in need because of injustice in society (1 = agree, 0 = not indicated) Referent Category</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlucky</td>
<td>People are living in need because they are unlucky (1 = agree, 0 = not indicated)</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Progress</td>
<td>People are living in need because of modern progress (1 = agree, 0 = not indicated)</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>None of the above reasons (1 = agree, 0 = not indicated)</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biographical Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45.261</td>
<td>16.509</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-Squared</td>
<td>Age-Squared</td>
<td>2,321.203</td>
<td>1,603.878</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>9,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1 = male, 0 = female</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Marital status (1 = married, 0 = otherwise)</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have Children</td>
<td>Respondent has children (0 = no, ≥1 = 1)</td>
<td>.774</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Highest level of education (1 = no elementary, 8 = university degree)</td>
<td>4.767</td>
<td>2.081</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Scale</td>
<td>Respondent’s position on 10 point income scale</td>
<td>4.946</td>
<td>2.603</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Employment status (1 = employed, 0 = otherwise)</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time with Friends</td>
<td>Time spent with friends (1 = not at all 4 = weekly)</td>
<td>3.271</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time with Colleagues</td>
<td>Time spent with colleagues (1 = not at all 4 = weekly)</td>
<td>2.268</td>
<td>1.176</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Political Views</td>
<td>Respondent holds left-wing political views (0 = no or right; 1 = yes or left)</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Low Cost Model 1</td>
<td>Mod. Cost Model 2</td>
<td>High Cost Model 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.003* (.002)</td>
<td>1.011*** (.002)</td>
<td>.999 (.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age^2</td>
<td>.999*** (.000)</td>
<td>.999*** (.000)</td>
<td>.999*** (.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.039 (.039)</td>
<td>1.324*** (.053)</td>
<td>1.634*** (.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.931 (.044)</td>
<td>.885* (.044)</td>
<td>.682*** (.056)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has Children</td>
<td>1.096 (.063)</td>
<td>1.009 (.061)</td>
<td>1.192 (.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.169*** (.012)</td>
<td>1.149*** (.012)</td>
<td>1.020 (.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Scale</td>
<td>1.031*** (.009)</td>
<td>1.035*** (.009)</td>
<td>1.024 (.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.826 (.150)</td>
<td>1.234 (.280)</td>
<td>1.472 (.602)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time with Colleagues</td>
<td>1.039 (.021)</td>
<td>1.081*** (.023)</td>
<td>1.058 (.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time with Friends</td>
<td>1.144*** (.029)</td>
<td>1.083** (.029)</td>
<td>1.085 (.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Wing Political Views</td>
<td>1.210*** (.046)</td>
<td>1.374*** (.056)</td>
<td>1.386*** (.096)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.238*** (.020)</td>
<td>1.223*** (.018)</td>
<td>1.169*** (.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>1.110* (.048)</td>
<td>1.101* (.051)</td>
<td>.910 (.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Injustice</td>
<td>1.307*** (.059)</td>
<td>1.514*** (.072)</td>
<td>1.504*** (.118)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Progress</td>
<td>1.172** (.057)</td>
<td>1.178** (.057)</td>
<td>1.292** (.111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.172 (.117)</td>
<td>1.122 (.117)</td>
<td>1.079 (.180)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and high-cost CA (Models 2 and 3). Just as past research has typically found that politically left leaning individuals are more likely to participate in CA (see Schussman and Soule 2005), we also find that being politically left leaning is associated with higher log odds of participating in all three types of CA.

Moving to the independent variables, internal efficacy is associated with higher log odds of participating in low- and moderate-cost CA (Models 1 and 2), but is not significantly associated with high-cost CA (Model 3), which provides partial support for H1. Consistent with past research, organizational embeddedness is associated with higher log odds of participating in all types of CA (see Kitts 1999; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008), supporting H2. Individuals with perceptions of legitimate structural disadvantage (i.e., modern progress) and perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage (i.e., structural injustice) have higher log odds of participating in all types of CA compared to individuals who believe inequality is due to laziness or luck. This provides strong support for H3. To test H4, we estimated additional models with modern progress as the referent category (models not shown). Individuals with perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage have higher log odds of participating in all types of CA compared to individuals with perceptions of legitimate structural disadvantage. This supports H4.

Next, in Table 3, we estimate interaction terms between both measures of efficacy and perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage (i.e., structural injustice) for low-, moderate-, and high-cost CA, respectively. We predicted that the interaction effect would be more likely for high-cost CA (H5). Models 4, 7,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Low Cost</th>
<th>Mod. Cost</th>
<th>High Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Model 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.238***</td>
<td>1.237***</td>
<td>1.237***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>1.109*</td>
<td>1.110*</td>
<td>1.109*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Injustice</td>
<td>1.307***</td>
<td>1.309***</td>
<td>1.309***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Progress</td>
<td>1.172**</td>
<td>1.171**</td>
<td>1.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
<td>(.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy × Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy × Structural</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.979</td>
<td>.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy × Modern</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy × None</td>
<td>.952</td>
<td>.952</td>
<td>.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
HGLM Models Predicting Collective Action, Odds Ratios (SE)^1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Cost</th>
<th>Mod. Cost</th>
<th>High Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 4</td>
<td>Model 5</td>
<td>Model 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.892</td>
<td>.892</td>
<td>.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
<td>(.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−89,895</td>
<td>−89,895</td>
<td>−89,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $X^2$</td>
<td>1,514***</td>
<td>1,514***</td>
<td>1,512***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 22,388$ individuals and 29 countries; ***(p < .001, **(p < .01, *p < .05).

1All control variables are included in the models.
and 10 include the interaction term between internal efficacy and perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage predicting each type of CA, respectively. The results show that the interaction term is not significant for low- or moderate-cost CA, but is significant for high-cost CA as predicted. Internally efficacious individuals have higher log odds of participating in high-cost CA when they have perceptions of structural injustice compared to when they believe that inequality is due to laziness or luck. This interaction significantly improves model fit (chi-square = 4.84, p < .05). Since the average effect of internal efficacy centers on zero (i.e., is not statistically significant in Model 3), the effect of internal efficacy is entirely conditional on perceptions of structural injustice. Figure 3 visually depicts this: the predicted probability of engaging in high-cost CA for those who perceive inequality as due to laziness/luck is effectively the same for those with and without internal efficacy. Internal efficacy only matters for predicting high-cost CA among individuals who perceive inequality as rooted in structural injustice; for those individuals, being internally efficacious increases their likelihood of engaging in high-cost CA. Next, in Models 5, 8, and 11, we estimate interaction terms between organizational embeddedness and perceptions of structural injustice for each type of CA, respectively. The results parallel those for the interaction term between internal efficacy and per-

![Figure 3](image-url)

**Figure 3** Predicted Probabilities for High Cost Collective Action as a Function of Internal Efficacy and Structural Injustice.
ceptions of structural injustice: individuals who are more organizationally embedded have higher log odds of participating in high-cost CA when they have perceptions of structural injustice compared to individuals who believe that inequality is due to laziness or luck (Model 11). This interaction also significantly improves model fit (chi-square = 4.25, \( p < .05 \)). These results provide support for H5. Figure 4 provides a more nuanced look at this conditional relationship. For those with perceptions of structural injustice, going from 0 organizational affiliations to 1 or 2 increases the predicted probability of engaging in high-cost CA, but additional affiliations do not add any further explanatory power. On the other hand, for those who perceive inequality as due to laziness/luck, additional organizational affiliations do matter and increase the predicted probability of engaging in high-cost CA albeit at a decreasing rate. Finally, in Models 6, 9, and 12, both interaction terms are included and they remain statistically significant in Model 12. Although both interaction terms significantly improve the fit of the model predicting high-cost CA (chi-square = 7.29, \( p < .05 \)), they are modest effects. However, the smaller interaction effects are consistent with the rarity of engaging in high-cost CA. The predicted probability for engaging in high-cost action is .044, which is considerably smaller than that for engaging in low-cost CA (.472) and moderate-cost CA (.240). Far fewer control variables have significant effects on high-

![Figure 4](image-url)
cost CA (only age-squared, married, gender, and left-wing political views) compared to the other two forms of CA, which makes even the modest interaction effects notable for helping to account for a more rare form of CA.

Additional models were estimated testing an interaction term between modern progress and both measures of efficacy for all three types of CA (results not shown); however, these interaction terms were not statistically significant in any model. Thus, H5 is only supported when structural disadvantage is perceived as unjust and not when it is perceived as legitimate. To test H6, we also estimated interaction effects between perceptions of structural injustice and both measures of efficacy but with modern progress as the referent category (results not shown). These interaction effects were not statistically significant for low- and moderate-cost CA, but were statistically significant for high-cost CA. Internally efficacious individuals and more organizationally embedded individuals have higher log odds of participating in high-cost CA when they have perceptions of structural injustice compared to when they believe that inequality is due to modern progress. This finding is consistent with H6, which predicted that the effect of efficacy on high-cost CA would be stronger for individuals with perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage compared to those with perceptions of legitimate structural disadvantage.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

Unjust inequality has become an important political topic. Although the “war on inequality” has increased the salience of the issue across different national publics, it did not create the public’s general concern over unjust inequality. Rather, it has activated and refocused pre-existing dormant concerns. In asking why mobilization around inequality and injustice has only recently occurred, not only in the United States but in many other countries around the world, we can suggest certain modest speculations based on our analyses. Chief among them is that there was likely a convergence of an ever-growing perception of injustice with a stronger sense that these injustices can be rectified through the use of high-cost tactics. No doubt punctuated by recent events such as the economic collapse and a perception of corruption among political and economic elites, we also posit that across countries, perceptions of injustice and efficacy may contribute to a rise in moral protests (see Jasper 1997), which might explain the use of high-cost CA.

Past research on social psychological predictors of CA was divided into two branches—studies focusing on perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice and research investigating various forms of efficacy. These lines of research were rooted in different theoretical foundations—RDT and VET—and rarely considered perceptions of structural injustice and efficacy together. In this article, we theoretically integrate these two strands of research through
INJUSTICE, EFFICACY, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 25

VET and propose that perceptions of structural disadvantage, both legitimate and unjust, contribute to the perceived value of the collective good, that is, the instrumentality and value of the social changes sought. We argue that in order for change to be viewed as instrumental, the targeted inequality must be perceived as structural, something that can be fixed through CA. We also propose that the social and political changes advocated will be considered more valuable when the targeted structural inequality is perceived to be unjust. Although past research has highlighted the importance of perceptions of structural disadvantage and injustice, there has been little work testing whether perceived unjust structural disadvantage affects CA differently than structural disadvantage that is not viewed as unjust. Drawing on VET, we propose that both should be positively associated with CA but that the former should have a stronger effect through increasing the value of the perceived social changes. We find support for this proposition. Compared to individuals who view inequality as a result of laziness or luck, individuals who view inequality as a product of injustice in society or modern progress are more likely to participate in all types of CA. While both of these variables demonstrate structural disadvantage, only the former conveys injustice. The results also show that those who believe inequality is due to injustice in society are more likely to participate in all types of CA compared to individuals who believe it is due to modern progress. Thus, our prediction about a stronger effect for perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage compared to legitimate structural disadvantage is supported. Overall, these findings suggest that individuals are more likely to participate in CA when they believe inequality should be changed due to its unjustness and can be changed through CA (i.e., because it is perceived to be rooted in structural characteristics).

Drawing on VET, we also hypothesized that internal efficacy and political efficacy would be positively associated with participation in CA and that these positive effects would be moderated by perceptions of legitimate and unjust structural disadvantage. Because past studies typically investigated efficacy and perceptions of structural injustice separately, there are no prior studies testing this interaction effect. While some social movement research on cognitive liberation suggested conditional relationships between these variables, it did not provide an integrated theoretical framework to derive them and also failed to consider the role of participation costs. Using VET, we proposed that this conditional relationship would be more likely when the costs of participation are high since individuals would need higher levels of motivation (i.e., efficacy multiplied by the value of the good) to overcome the costs. We find strong support for these predictions. Internal efficacy is positively associated with participation in low- and moderate-cost CA and organizational embeddedness, a proxy for political efficacy, is positively associated with all types of CA. As
predicted, both measures of efficacy interact with perceptions of structural injustice for predicting high-cost CA but not the other two types. Individuals who are efficacious and view inequality as rooted in society are more likely to engage in high-cost CA compared to both those who view inequality as rooted in individual characteristics and to those who perceive it as a result of modern progress. This is consistent with our prediction that the interaction effect would be stronger for perceptions of unjust structural disadvantage through increasing the value of the good than for legitimate structural disadvantage (i.e., modern progress). The parallel interaction effects for both measures of efficacy predicting only high-cost CA support the underlying theoretical prediction that it is easier to overcome high participation costs, when individuals highly value the good (i.e., perceive structural injustice) and are efficacious. It is important to note that our models are more predictive of low- and moderate-cost action than high-cost action; however, this is principally due to several standard control variables failing to have significant effects in these models. Our independent variables have similar effects across all types of CA. Although the interaction effects are modest, they contribute to explaining variation in a more rare form of CA, which is notable given that several standard control variables have no significant effects.

Most past research on efficacy, perceptions of structural injustice, and CA used small-N, single country samples typically focused on more economically advanced countries and particular social movements or events. Using the World Values Survey and 29 countries, our results provide support for the generalizability of previous findings to a wider array of countries, including less economically advanced and post-Soviet. In this study, we focused on explaining within-country variation in CA across different types of countries and did not examine cross-country variation. There is an extensive body of research on the effect of political opportunity structures on cross-country variation in CA as well as on the choice of tactics used (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). The modeling technique we employed allowed us to account for correlated cases due to national residence; however, it would be useful for future studies to examine how the political opportunity structure may connect to social psychological factors—such as efficacy and perceptions of structural injustice—to in turn affect CA (see Corcoran, Pettinicchio, and Young 2011).

The present investigation is not without limitations. First, our country-level sample is restricted to 29 countries and biased toward western countries, although not limited to them. While a more diverse country sample is preferable, our results nevertheless offer insight into the generalizability of hypotheses beyond previous studies of economically advanced countries. Our sample is therefore an improvement over prior research. However, in order to test our hypotheses across this sample, we needed to use general measures of efficacy.
and perceptions of structural disadvantage that would cut across different countries, movements, issues, and types of action. Although our measure of internal efficacy follows prior research (Sastry and Ross 1998; Verme 2009; Welzel and Inglehart 2010), we also use organizational embeddedness as a proxy for political efficacy, as prior research has found that participation in voluntary associations is positively associated with it (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008; McClurg 2003). Another explanation for the relationship between organizational embeddedness and CA may be that the former encourages interpersonal social ties that draw one into political activity (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). To help address this, we controlled for social embeddedness—time spent with friends and colleagues. Although social networks are a vital means of social movement recruitment (Jasper 1997; Kitts 1999, 2000; Munson 2008), the WVS does not include direct measures of whether an individual was invited by a friend to engage in CA. It may be the case that individual perceptions of injustice and efficacy make one more receptive to invitations from friends to engage in CA. In this case, perceptions of injustice and their interaction with efficacy would still be important, but they would have indirect effects on CA through friendship networks. This provides an interesting avenue for future research. Our perception of inequality measure is also limited in that it focuses on economic inequality—"why are people in need?"—which should be more likely to affect CA toward economic issues. Since our measures of CA cannot be separated based on issue, the findings for perceptions of inequality may be weaker than if we had used a more general measure. Still, the fact that perceived structural injustice and modern progress have strong, significant effects across all types of CA, even though they are more specific measures, suggests that they are capturing an important component of perceptions of inequality. Although the WVS allows us to measure low-, moderate-, and high-cost CA, it does not include any measures of violent CA; thus, we are unable to make claims regarding extremely high-cost CA.

Second, the data are cross-sectional and therefore, we cannot make claims about causality. Some variables we specify as preceding CA may in fact follow from it. Experiments or longitudinal data are useful for drawing causal inference, but are typically unrealistic for large-N cross-national studies. Moreover, the current study contributes to the literature by predicting actual participation in CA, rather than willingness to participate as was used in most previous experimental studies. Nevertheless, past experimental and longitudinal studies in the United States testing the effects of efficacy and perceptions of injustice on CA tendencies strengthen our confidence in the specification of the model (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) meta-analysis of research on the effects of perceived injustice and efficacy on CA finds no significant differences in the effect sizes for cross-
sectional studies compared to causal studies. This means “that even if reverse causality can, in some cases, be a significant occurrence, the magnitude of these reverse effects is not such that they would entirely invalidate causal inferences drawn from the observations of cross-sectional data (p. 516).” These results lend credence to the use of cross-sectional data for testing the effects of efficacy and perceptions of structural disadvantage on CA. While it has limitations, the results identify important relationships between efficacy, perceptions of structural disadvantage, and CA cross-nationally.

Recently, Meyer and Rohlinger (2012) have written on the “myth of ideas and social change.” Part of their discussion centers on the perpetuation of the belief by 1960s classic texts that if individuals see an injustice they will mobilize to address that injustice and the lack of CA must be due to ignorance, “not political opposition, despair, or resignation (p. 150).” We agree with Meyer and Rohlinger’s criticism of this view of social change and suggest that it is not simply a matter of knowing about inequality and injustice that leads to automatic mobilization. While unjust inequality is a quintessential social problem, the belief that inequality is rooted in personal characteristics rather than the social structure is itself a social problem since it inhibits individuals from engaging in CA to rectify inequalities. While this study focused on predicting individual-level participation in CA, future research would benefit from exploring whether our findings can be extended to predict group-level mobilization outcomes. For example, mass rallies can draw hundreds of thousands of people in very short periods of time. This prompts the question: Are protests more successful at mobilizing people when they highlight injustice frames and find methods to increase feelings of efficacy? While we can only speculate, we suspect that in societies where people are fatalistic and overwhelmingly view inequality as due to personal characteristics, SMOs and protest events will have a more difficult time mobilizing individuals. Under these conditions, they would not only have to facilitate overcoming fatalistic views among potential participants, but also convince them that there indeed is an injustice that can be corrected through participation in CA. In other words, a pre-existing sense of efficacy and perceptions of structural injustice should facilitate efforts in politically mobilizing individuals.

**ENDNOTES**

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1CA refers to any action in which the primary goal is to improve the social conditions of a group of people (van Zomeren and Iyer 2009). Following van van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008), we restrict CA to “expressions of protest against collective disadvantage” (p. 512).
These studies present dual-pathway models of motivation for CA with one pathway emphasizing efficacy and the other injustice. We contribute to the literature by focusing on how perceptions of structural disadvantage can be integrated into one motivational pathway through VET and how it can be used to predict conditional relationships between the two.

While alternative theories may specify a different functional relationship between efficacy and the value of the good, because we are extending Klandermans’ (1983, 1984) value-expectancy theory and are interested in the interaction between efficacy and the value of the good, we specify a multiplicative relationship between the two.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine.

The following question preceded the list of political actions: “Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.”

We follow past research and differentiate the types of actions by cost; however, these designations primarily refer to the intrinsic costs, such as time and effort, which are generally related to these different types of CA. While the absolute cost may increase or decrease depending on the particular country context, we expect that the relative cost of the different types of action within countries will remain the same (e.g., petitions should be less costly than strikes regardless of whether they are costlier in one country versus another). Because of this and our exclusive focus on within-country variation in CA, the absolute cost of these types of actions in different countries will not affect our results. Moreover, in additional analyses (not shown), we combined low-cost and moderate-cost CA into one measure. This does not change the results.

Respondents were asked “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means “none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”

It is possible for individuals to view “modern progress” as unjust or illegitimate. However, we suspect that if this was the case and injustice was the most salient response for them that they would have chosen “injustice in society”, which can also capture injustice due to modern progress. Moreover, the term “progress” conveys a more positive or legitimate evaluation of a societal structure, whereas “injustice in society” carries a negative evaluation.

Models with only “laziness” as the referent category do not change the results. As “laziness” does not significantly differ from “unlucky” in predicting CA, we combined them.

We did, however, estimate additional analyses with several country-level predictors (results not shown). We controlled for the GINI coefficient as a measure of inequality, per capita GDP as a measure of economic development, and internet users per 100 people as a measure of access to information (World Bank 2000). We also investigate two different measures of regime type in separate models: democratic consolidation (i.e., length of time a country has been democratic) from the Database of Political Institutions and electoral self-determination (see Cingranelli and Richards 2008), which captures the degree of state facilitation and/or repression. Our individual-level results remain the same regardless of these country-level controls.

We began by estimating baseline models with only the control variables (results not shown). The effects of the control variables remain the same when the independent variables are included in the models.
REFERENCES


