Institutional Activism: Reconsidering the Insider/Outsider Dichotomy

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Abstract

Social movements are conventionally understood as a means by which groups seek to resolve collective grievances outside of the regular political process. With this in mind, I explore the important role of “institutional activists” — insiders with access to resources and power — who proactively take up causes that overlap with those of grassroots challengers. This article focuses on the history of, and recent developments in, the study of institutional activism, situating the concept within existing social movement theory and providing examples of the varying roles of institutional activists in mobilization.

Introduction

When one thinks of social movements or social movement activists, an image comes to mind of a group of challengers with common goals flooding the streets protesting for a public good such as clean air, civil rights, and immigration reform. Indeed, sociologists have, by and large, conceptualized social movements as extra-institutional — that is, as a way to resolve grievances outside of the regular political process. Thus, the conventional understanding of social movements is that their leaders, participants and organizations exist outside of the state. Although the understanding of social movements has increasingly come to include a more routine view of their role in politics — an “extension of institutionalized action” (see Jenkins 1983 on resource mobilization theory) — a simple review of the definitions of social movements (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 1998; Turner and Killian [1957]1972) reveals that the conventional understanding of movements still fundamentally situates them on the outside: terms like “extra-institutional,” collective challenges by “ordinary people,” “the margins of the political system,” and so on. Outsider tactics are “seen as disruptive by the public and outside the bonds of conventional politics…” and these are associated with groups who “have little institutional power and are on the bottom of the racial, ethnic, and class hierarchies.” (Valocchi 2010: 70, 79). This perspective emphasizes a “bottom-up” framework for understanding the origins of social and political change. Given this understanding however, where might we situate institutional activists — those with access to resources and power who proactively work on issues shared with grassroots challengers?

Classic collective behavior theory which emerged out of the Chicago School of Sociology in the early twentieth century treated collective action as spontaneous and as outside of normal institutions (Blumer 1951; Park [1927], 1967; Turner and Killian [1957]1972). By the 1970s, scholars began to draw parallels between studies of organizational management and social movement dynamics (Zald and Ash 1966; Oberschall 1973; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). The notion thus emerged that
professional and formal social movement organizations (SMOs) are necessary for obtaining external (and often, elite) resources (see McAdam et al. 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977). In addition, SMOs are founded by highly skilled professional entrepreneurs and these organizations are particularly capable of accessing external resources since they resemble the formal institutions with which they are interacting (see Hawley 1968; DiMaggio and Powell 1983 on isomorphism).

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and formal SMOs in mobilizing external resources required for successfully challenging authority. Nonetheless, these organizations are still treated as “outsider” groups no matter how much legitimacy is granted to them (Gamson 1990). Thus, although RMT was the first theory to treat social movements as an entrepreneurial endeavor that emphasizes professional activists, this perspective still reinforced the insider/outsider dichotomy in asserting that challengers, who are outside of the polity, eventually require formal structures to access inside resources and to gain the attention of sympathetic elites. As Santoro and McGuire (1997, 504) state, “Implicit in resource mobilization theory is the view that movement actors and political opportunities are conceptually distinct and mutually exclusive.”

Unlike RMT, political process theory (PPT) tends to emphasize grassroots challenges, particularly the use of protest, over formal movement entrepreneurship. PPT places a great deal of emphasis on political elites as being either sympathetic or antagonistic towards outside challengers and inherently treats social movements as outsiders vis-à-vis the political opportunity structure (POS). POS broadly refers to elite alignments and divisions, the degree of access to elites, and the presence of allies within institutions which shape the nature of mobilization. The concept of the “cycle of contention” highlights the conventional understanding of the relationship between outside challengers and elites: it is a sustained conflict between outsiders and insiders where outsiders temporarily have leverage in getting their claims dealt with by insiders (Tarrow 1998). Once insiders respond, mobilization declines.

Because the interaction between movement and state is seen almost exclusively as extra-institutional (Goldstone 2003; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995), PPT has not necessarily lead to a better understanding of the role of institutional activists. There are three major reasons why this is so. First, social movements cannot be both part of political institutions and also be affected by these very same political institutions since this would create an endogeneity problem – that is, when the variables expected to affect an outcome (social movements) are also a part of that outcome (the POS). In addition, as Meyer’s (2005) discussion of social movements and policy responses suggests, there is a chicken-and-egg type relationship between the work of insiders (like the enactment of policy) and the efforts of challengers (like protest events). Which comes first and how do we disentangle cause-and-effect?

Second, although PPT does focus on the role of political elites, it tends to treat elites as reactionary rather than as proactive. Elites are seen as responding to challengers which eventually marks the decline of mobilization (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998, 1989; Koopmans 1993; see also Haines 1984). Thus, in this model, elites respond to movement claims either by accommodating challengers or by increasing repression. This perspective has been rather silent on the ways in which institutional activists can proactively pursue a cause without direct outside pressure or how the actions of insiders can even unknowingly initiate mobilization and provide a framework for protest.

Third, it is thought that social movements eventually decline either because they meet success or failure depending on the reaction of elites (see Blumer 1969; Giugni 1999;
One possible result is cooptation – a process whereby authorities manage outsider threats by superficially institutionalizing challengers (see Selznick 1949). Michels (1911, 1962) believed that cooptation disproportionately aids those interested in maintaining the status quo, and that by coopting challengers into the elite class, it derails movements from subsequently challenging these institutions (see also Cress and Snow 1996). Thus, a negative connotation has surrounded “institutions” and “institutionalization.” As Tarrow (1989, 1998) argues, working too closely with institutions (i.e., insiders) can lead to movements becoming too “imbued with their logic and values.” Yet, if a movement is to endure, institutionalization of some kind appears to be inevitable at the decline of a protest wave.

For these reasons, the insider/outsider dichotomy remains a salient feature of our understanding of the relationship between outside challengers and political insiders. The role of institutional activists calls that dichotomy into question. There is a growing recognition of the fact that social movements have become part of “everyday politics” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) which at the very most means that they are embedded within political institutions, and at the very least, suggests that they have close links to “the inside.” Numerous contemporary examples highlight the inadequacies of the conventional understanding of insider/outsider (see Goldstone 2003, 2004). For example, labor parties in Europe have had intimate links to social movements; Green Parties are an institutionalized extension of the environmental movement; the Prohibition Party in the US was an institutional wing of the Progressive Movement; the rise of the American welfare state is a product of both outside challenges and the work of institutional activists who furthered the cause; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 – one of the most important disability rights policies – was largely the result of the entrepreneurship of Congressional members and their staff; and more recently, the Tea Party movement has been simultaneously treated as a grassroots movement and as an elite movement that “hijacked” the Republican Party. These examples blur the distinction between insider and outsider; between activist and institutional activist.

Defining institutional activism

The concept of institutional activist or activism (Banaszak 2005; Pierson 1994; Santoro and McGuire 1997; Tilly 1978) is not a rigid one. Basically, institutional activists are individuals who affect change (from changing organizational norms to policy reform) from within organizations and institutions. However, the concept’s flexibility has also lead to important variations of its use. Institutional activist and activism is similar to, and often times (depending on the movement in question) interchangeable with, concepts like sympathetic elites (Tarrow 1998), institutional entrepreneurs (Reichman and Canan 2003; Roa et al. 2000), idea/issue/meaning entrepreneurs (Skrentny 2002; Steensland 2008), moral entrepreneurs (Gusfield 1963), elite mobilization (McCarthy 2005), state-movement coalitions (Stearns and Almeida 2004), and inside agitators (Eisenstein 1996). These terms denote varying degrees of elite claims-making because, as Banaszak (2005, 156) argues, different movements have different degrees of outsider status. Constituents can be legally or normatively excluded from the political process, they can be included but marginalized, or they can be included and highly influential. For instance, where blacks in the United States were legally excluded from the polity, the disabled were normatively excluded as it was believed that they could not advocate on their own behalf. Thus, the role institutional activists play is highly dependent on how much exclusion a movement or constituency experiences.
Both Tilly (1978) and Pierson (1994) characterize institutional activists as those with access to institutional resources and the decision-making process who are working on movement issues. In other words, institutional activists are insiders working on outsider causes (Santoro and McGuire 1997). This implies that institutional activists take up an already existing cause championed by outside challengers. That is, issues are defined and framed by social movements before reaching insiders. For instance, Santoro and McGuire (1997) find that black elected officials and feminist politicians actively promoted affirmative action policy. They also find that feminist politicians were largely responsible for including comparable worth policies in the political agenda. Institutional activists play an important role following protest cycles when often times, elite responses push movements into the political arena (see Staggenborg 1991). Ruzza’s (1997) study of the Italian peace movement shows that institutional activists are important when protest cycles decline suggesting that they help outsiders when their influence becomes less efficacious. On the other hand, Ruzza also claims that institutional activists are more widespread when the cause is politically salient which implies that the main reason elites take on issues is because they are either pressured or influenced by social movements and/or public opinion.

Institutional activists can be much more entrepreneurial than is suggested by the conventional understanding described above. A growing literature in sociology and political science has shown that elites do not always take on issues because they are pressured to do so by public preferences or organized interests (Sulkin 2005). This means that institutional activists may act as issue entrepreneurs because of personal histories and experiences with an issue or constituency, biographical characteristics, ideology, and career ambitions (Costain and Majstrovic 1994; Reichman and Canan 2003; Sulkin 2005). Framing the problem and its remedies can be done on the inside (see Reichman and Canan 2003 on “ozone entrepreneurs” and Skrentny 2002 on “idea entrepreneurs” and Steensland’s 2008 “ideational diffusion”). In turn, the actions of elites, such as policy, programs, and the creation of government agencies, can create new constituencies (see Meyer 2005) as well as new opportunities for mobilization (see Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005; see also Baumgartner and Jones 2002 and the Public Agendas Project). Banaszak (2005, 2010) emphasizes how policies create accompanying regulatory agencies and staffs with whom movement actors can develop a relationship, especially the ways in which these can come to incorporate movement activists into the government. In addition, personnel within the legislature and the executive branch may actively create new opportunities for movement actors while in some cases, governmental and bureaucratic rules and norms may encourage activism within the government.

Scattered studies have provided a framework for understanding the dynamic interplay between insiders and outsiders. Their work showcases the flexibility of the concept. Some scholars focus on the ways in which opportunities for mobilization are initiated by institutional activists (e.g., Costain 1992; Katzmann 1986; Scotch 2001), some on how insiders take on a movement cause (e.g., Santoro and McGuire 1997), and others on how outsiders become insiders while remaining movement activists (e.g., Banaszak 2005, 2010). Drawing from these works, we can make some general conclusions about the role of institutional activists. First, they are not just reactionary, but rather, they proactively work on issues that overlap with social movements. Second, institutional activists have access (or gain access) to institutional resources and have some influence over the policy-making/implementation process. Third, they not only believe in the cause, but will promote that cause even after mobilization declines (especially if outsiders are brought into the state). And finally, institutional activists may pursue favorable policy or expand existing policy without any push from outsiders.
Examples of institutional activism

Since the definition of institutional activism comes in a variety of forms, it is useful to describe some examples that showcase the concept’s flexibility. This flexibility is important because, as Banaszak (2005) points out, constituencies and the social movements that advocate on their behalf experience different levels of exclusion. The examples I discuss illustrate three important aspects of institutional activism. The welfare state example sheds light on the ways in which the relationship between insiders and outsiders evolves over time, especially when threats to existing social policy are perceived to exist. The women’s movement illustrates the ways in which outsiders become insiders yet can still encourage and even participate in protest. Finally, the example of disability rights showcases how institutional entrepreneurs, without any pressure from grassroots activists, pursue equal rights policy which later creates a new political opportunity and framework for mobilization.

Institutional activists and entrenchment: welfare state politics

Welfare-state politics in the US sheds a great deal of light on the relationship between the work of outsiders, institutional activists, and the entrenchment of social welfare policy. Institutional theory focuses on the ways in which institutions – which are usually thought of as stable and resilient – undergo change. Institutions often change at critical junctures, such as times of economic crisis, which require responses on the part of individuals, like policies or programs, which eventually become entrenched or institutionalized. Political elites make particular decisions and, “once actors have ventured far down a particular path, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course… The ‘path not taken’ or the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 699). The rise of the American welfare state highlights the dynamic interplay between outside pressures to reform and the critical role of the decisions made by institutional activists to take up the cause of social reform and maintain support for that cause over time.

In the initial development of the welfare state, the US, unlike Europe, did not have many institutional activists to promote social and economic reforms, and challengers, both on the inside and outside, were especially critical in demanding social welfare reforms (Orloff 1988). When political elites in the US were largely opposed to government involvement in social welfare policy before the 1930s, pressure from labor unions and interest organizations (for instance, the Share our Wealth Movement and the National Union for Social Justice) got welfare policies on the political agenda. As early as 1906, the American Association for Labor Legislation, composed primarily of social scientists, as well as many regional organizations such as the Consumer League of Ohio, were pushing for social reforms (see Skocpol 1995). Eventually, the Great Depression created an opportunity for institutional change. But, the work of outsiders is not enough to explain New Deal policies. Although there was a push by social movement activists and interest organizations to get the state involved in social welfare, the enactment, and subsequent entrenchment of these policies would not have happened if political elites, including the “ever-expanding and shrewdly persistent social welfare bureaucracy” (Patterson 1994, 93), were not directly involved in pressing for these policies and later pushing for welfare expansion (see also Pratt 1976). Institutional activists – from presidents to justices of the Supreme Court – played a crucial role in ensuring the entrenchment or institutionalization of social welfare policies even in inopportune times (see Amenta and Skocpol 1988; Champagne and Harpham
1984; Pierson 1994). Thus, what had begun as a mix of inside and outside pressure to get the government involved in social welfare became a set of policies which were increasingly formalized and supported by elected officials and bureaucratic staff. Institutional activists not only made social change possible, but created a new framework for outside challengers later on, especially when the politics of the 1970s and 1980s posed threats to welfare (Pierson 1994). As Schattschneider (1935, 288) stated decades ago, “new policies create new politics.” Ultimately, retrenchment of the welfare state has been very difficult precisely because welfare states create constituencies outside and inside the government which come to the defense of these policies when threatened.

State feminism: institutional activists and the women’s movement

There is no other social movement that has produced as much work on institutional activism as the women’s movement. The women’s movement raises many of the contemporary debates about the role of insiders. First, much of the work on the feminist movement emphasizes the ways in which outsiders become insiders. Second, this allows for the possibility that insiders are not restricted to the use of institutional tactics and can actually promote or be involved in protest. Third, like the welfare state example, institutional activism in the women’s movement illustrates the importance of the bureaucracy and not just the elected body.

Scholars of the women’s movement (e.g., Rupp and Taylor 1987; Costain 1992; and Banaszak 2005 on state-movement intersections) place a great deal of importance on the establishment of the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women by the Kennedy Administration. The Commission created an opportunity for feminist consciousness, brought in existing activists into the polity, and eventually led to the creation of the National Organization of Women (NOW) in 1966. NOW had support from activists in the government and “the government unwillingly contributed to NOW’s early work” (Rupp and Taylor 1987, 180). This suggests that grassroots mobilization may take a back seat when government institutionalizes elements of the movement making part of the women’s movement “elite sustained” (Rupp and Taylor 1987, 194).

A similar argument is made by Eisenstein (1996) whereby women were “invited” (p. 18) into the Labor Party’s program of Australian reform in the 1970s. Generally, these women saw themselves as feminists who had prior experience as activists within other institutions and organizations, like the Catholic Church (see Collins 1986; Katzenstein 1998; Clemens 1999; Arthur 2008 on activists/outsiders within organizations). Among the issues raised by the Australian governmental commission was including more feminists within government agencies such that they would have an influence across a variety of policy domains. As Eisenstein notes, “the way to get women’s interests, interpreted as feminist interests, onto the agenda was to establish a bureaucratic presence” (p. 24). These “femocrats” were able to set the political agenda, were heavily involved in policy design and reform, became experts, and developed important networks within the bureaucracy. This is important strategically because elected officials can be voted out of office but the composition of the bureaucracy remains fairly stable. Eisenstein suggests that even though the goals of femocrats may have been radical such as the “abolition of Australian patriarchy in its myriad forms” (p. 50), inside agitators used institutional tactics to affect change.

Similarly, Katzenstein’s (1998) work on feminist activism within mainstream organizations like the Church and the military shows how women use “unobtrusive protest” (p. 10) to demand equal pay and address sexual harassment. Unobtrusive protest includes a mix of what she calls interest-group politics – the influence of elites within the rules of
the institution – and discursive politics referring to changing meanings and language surrounding the role of women. The latter is considered more radical as the goal is to completely redefine the role of women. Nonetheless, the tactics described by Katzenstein are seemingly akin to institutional tactics discussed more broadly in the social movement literature.

Banaszak (2005, 2010) more recent work takes issue with notion that insiders are limited to institutional tactics. Following prior work on state feminism, Banaszak argues that the government is not a monolith but rather, is composed of individual members both in the elected body and in the bureaucracy. These individuals are tied to the women's movement in varying degrees. This helps explain how outsiders can become incorporated within an institution, yet also remain movement activists. Prior work suggests that only those using institutional means will become femocrats. Banaszak’s work departs from this view as she does not treat institutional tactics and institutional activists as synonymous. This is important because being on the inside does not automatically translate into influence. Feminists can be brought into marginalized or ineffectual government branches (see Bonastia 2000 and Mazur 1995). Given that institutional activists’ influence can be limited on the inside, Banaszak shows that institutional activists can actually encourage the use of protest and that women employed by the government also participate in protest activity when met with obstacles.

Disability rights: a movement in the government

Proactive legislators, government officials, and presidents have been influential in promoting social change and as Walker (1991) argues, the mobilization of many disadvantaged groups in society, including the disabled, cannot be understood without a serious consideration of the role of insiders. The disability rights movement is an example of the ways in which insiders, without any push from outside challengers, pursued legislation that reframed disability discourse in terms of rights. Not surprisingly, Scotch (2001) and Skrentny (2002) consider the disability rights movement a “movement in the government.”

Although the President’s Committee for Employment of the Handicapped, founded in 1962, became a venue for organizing and networking, it would not be until the early 70s that rights and antidiscrimination became a serious part of the political discourse surrounding disability. In late 1971/early 1972, Senator Hubert Humphrey and Congressman Charles Vanik proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include handicap as grounds for discrimination. Although this failed, antidiscrimination language survived the committee process mostly because of, as Scotch (2001) argues, the work of institutional activists (mostly in the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped but also in the Education and Labor House Committee, including Senators Cranston, Williams, Randolph, Stafford and Javits, as well as Representatives Brademas and Quie and their staff). Nixon vetoed the bill twice on the grounds that it would cost too much, although no one seemed to be concerned with the impact of the antidiscrimination provision. After the bill was passed in 1973, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), an important champion of the law as one based on antidiscrimination and affirmative action (see Katzmann 1986), was charged with the responsibility of writing regulations. When HEW began external consultation with disability advocates publicizing the extent of the law, it not only created new network links between disability advocates that had little prior contact, but also brought these groups directly into the political process (Scotch 2001).
The disability rights movement also showcases the link between insider work and the use of protest. Although institutional entrepreneurs both in the legislative and executive branches reframed disability in terms of rights and pushed for legislation, Congress also retreated from disability rights when costs associated with the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act became more politically salient. When HEW stalled the writing of regulations and it became increasingly unclear how the Rehabilitation Act was to be implemented (since Congress remained silent on its legislative intent), many bureaucrats in the OCR were dismayed by the delay. As Scotch (2001) writes, institutional entrepreneurs encouraged disabled activists to protest against the HEW secretary in spring of 1976 since insiders felt they were increasingly met with obstacles within the government in pursuing a disability rights agenda. This echoes Banaszak’s (2005) point that the work of insiders and the use of disruptive tactics need not be mutually exclusive or antithetical. Indeed, protests against HEW were among the most intense protests in the history of the disability rights movement (see Scotch 1989; Mackelprang and Salsgiver 1999; Fleisher and Zames 2001. Protests would continue with subsequent attempts in the late 70s and early 80s to roll back rights that had been born out of the work of these institutional entrepreneurs.

Despite the fact that there have always been disability organizations lobbying the government for social services, and that disability issues had always been on the Congressional agenda, there was relatively little advocacy or direct action before the 1970s (see Barnartt 2010 on disability protest). This is because disability was not understood as a rights-based issue until institutional activists articulated an equality frame through various policies beginning in the late 1960s. Insiders created a new political opportunity for mobilization by providing a political resource, frame and target for collective action. This is an example of insiders, without any push from social movement activists, creating a subsequent opportunity for grassroots mobilization.

Discussion

Conventional ways of thinking about social movement mobilization has often precluded the important role of institutional activists who work on movement causes from the inside. The insider/outsider dichotomy raises broader questions about the nature of contemporary social movements in democratic states or what Meyer and Tarrow (1998) call “movement societies.” Some social movement scholars have come to ask whether social movements exclusively (or even mostly) operate outside the normal political process (see Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Goldstone 2003, 2004; Banaszak, Santoro and McGuire 1997). First, and drawing from RMT and the interest group model, scholars have shown that SMOs can simultaneously operate on both the inside and the outside to affect social change (see Cress and Snow 1996; Fisher et al. 2005; Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Minkoff 1999; Staggenborg 2001). The boundaries between SMOs and the state can often be blurry and fluid. As Goldstone (2003, 8) claims, “Social movement activity and conventional political activity are different but parallel approaches to influencing political outcomes often drawing on the same actors, targeting the same bodies, and seeking the same goals.”

Second, the growing recognition that social movements and institutional activists overlap – that social and political change can come from both the bottom and the top – has refocused attention on the role of movements within the broader political process. What is the influence of outside challengers net the effects of other variables such as party politics, ideological commitments, and the public’s policy preferences? For instance, we know that politicians, more often than not, respond to their constituents’ preferences (Burstein
2006; Monroe 1998; Stimson et al. 1994) especially when an issue is highly visible or salient (Burstein 2003, 2006). Scholars have also shown that elites can take up a cause because of personal histories, career ambitions, or for ideological reasons (Costain and Majstrovic 1994; Reichman and Canan 2003; Sulkin 2005). Thus, if SMOs seek to influence politicians, it is important to know when and how they will be influential particularly if the goals of a movement are not congruent with those of the electorate or with the agenda of political elites (see Burstein and Linton 2002; Pettinicchio 2010). In other words, exploring the role of institutional activists also means understanding how social movement activists and groups work with insiders, or themselves become insiders. Both outsiders and insiders play a role in framing issues and setting the policy agenda.

Finally, many scholars have moved beyond the conventional notion that institutionalization is synonymous with demobilization and the decline of a protest wave (Katzenstein 1998). A growing body of work has begun to conceptualize policy responses as actually mobilizing rather than demobilizing constituencies. Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005; see also Baumgartner and Jones 2002) argue that the policy agenda affects opportunities for mobilization. Sheingate’s (2006) work showcases the importance of political entrepreneurs and the “Congressional opportunity structure” and the ways in which issues gain attention. And, McCammon et al. (2007) work on the women’s jury movement suggests that policy can shape subsequent mobilization. A recent wave of studies focus on the importance of the legislative agenda on mobilization and how Congress can act as an initiator on issues that overlap with those of social movements (Johnson 2008; Johnson et al. 2010; King et al. 2007; Olzak and Soule 2009). Collectively, their work emphasizes the ways in which political elites are not simply responding to outside pressures, but rather, that they are entrepreneurial in promoting social change while often times creating new opportunities for outside challenges.

Short Biography

David Pettinicchio is a PhD Candidate in Sociology at the University of Washington. His research interests include social movements and political sociology, as well as law, societies and justice. His dissertation, which is in part funded by a National Science Foundation Dissertation Improvement Grant, focuses on the ways in which institutional entrepreneurs politicize constituencies and create opportunities for mobilization. He uses this framework to explain the rise of the disability rights movement, particularly the link between entrepreneurship, organizational expansion and change, and the use of protest and other tactics. He also has broader interests in collective action, ethnic nationalism, and social problems. His research has appeared in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and Social Indicators Research, as well forthcoming pieces in the British Journal of Social Psychology and Nations and Nationalism.

Note

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