

**Pratiques et esthétique de la déviance
en Amérique du Nord**

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AMERIBER (CARHISP)

**Pratiques et esthétique de la déviance
en Amérique du Nord**

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PRESSES UNIVERSITAIRES DE BORDEAUX

1– SOCIOLOGIE DE LA DÉVIANCE

Cultures of Inequality, Threat and Imprisonment

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“We cannot yet speak of American-like ghettos in Europe, but the structural economic conditions for the formation of ghettos exist in Europe nowadays and they will develop quite rapidly, if the economic revitalization is carried out without due respect to the social integration of all the unemployed, young and old.”

(Schuyt 305)

INTRODUCTION

“They had everything we had, the schools, the opportunities, the chance to make something of themselves, but they didn’t take advantage of it.” This statement was made to one of the authors late in the evening of December 31, 1999. The speaker, an Afrikaner, was telling the American how we, outsiders, did not really understand the issues during apartheid. He was speaking of the Black South African majority, many of whom he felt had values that made them less willing to work hard, more willing to depend on the dole, and more crime prone. We have heard similar statements in western European countries, Canada, and in numerous American cities. The objects of these assertions changes in each place, but the underlying conceptualization of these “men in the streets” is the same. “Those people” are in disadvantaged circumstances because of their own doing.

This “stigmatization” is central to the processes that cause some categories of people to be more likely to be labeled deviant or criminal, and, consequently, to be subject to the formal or informal social control mechanisms of a society, such as the social pressures exerted by the “normal” population. Here we will explore cultural mechanisms that subject ethno racial minorities and immigrants to be disproportionately placed in such “outsider” categories.

Stigmatizing characterizations have been expressed by some who command public platforms, including political leaders. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, while serving as Interior Minister, called rioters in the Paris suburbs “scum.” A recent candidate for the office of County Executive, in the most progressive county in one of the more progressive American states, responded to an academic who sought to explain rioting in Los Angeles after the acquittal of police officers in the beating of Rodney King, by saying “aren’t they just thugs?” The rise of such sentiments underlies a belief that the poor and the criminal are people who simply choose to be that way, or they are carriers of pathological norms and values. They are nearly solely to blame for their circumstances. And, to an extent, it is the state that has allowed, even encouraged, their slovenliness. We have allowed them to be irresponsible to themselves and to others; so the best thing we can do for them is to end their dependence. Bill Clinton was proud that his administration “ended welfare as we knew it.” Piven (26) wrote “[t]he welfare state is under attack in all of the rich countries where it flourished over the course of the twentieth century.” Frequently stigmatized images of the needy provide justification for such attacks.

This argument reached its full flower in the writing of several American social scientists who alleged the existence of a culture of poverty that was the cause of many inner city problems like crime, poverty, and drug use (Banfield 258; Murray 155). But, as Schuyt notes in the quote above, the problems of ghettos are no longer simply an American problem. Rather than relying on culture of poverty arguments, which place the blame for their disadvantage on the poor themselves, we argue that the more important policy implications, whether criminal justice or welfare-state oriented, are really responses to beliefs about inequality in general populations. In this paper, we examine sociopolitical consequences of the cross-national differences in the tolerance

for inequality. We elaborate on Crutchfield and Pettinicchio's (136) conceptualization of the cultures of inequality thesis and further describe the possible structural causes of tolerance for inequality in national populations. We test whether tastes for inequality increase punitiveness, particularly towards "others." In these analyses, we expand the sample to include non-Western and less industrialized countries. We use cross-national data both at the individual and national levels. Since national structural and institutional characteristics are important parts of the cultures of inequality argument, it is necessary to have a large enough cross-national sample with variation to use multivariate analytic techniques.

THE CULTURES OF INEQUALITY THESIS

Culture of inequality refers to the legitimization, or the acceptance of social and economic inequality by the citizenry. Acceptance of inequality means that the general population has a "taste," or tolerance, for inequality, which can justify the maintenance of a minimal welfare system or roll backs of existing social programs, as well as punitive criminal justice policies. Societies with high "tastes for inequality" tend to justify the extermination of, or limiting, welfare benefits so that the deprived are forced to accept personal responsibility for their circumstance. Where there is a culture of inequality, significant numbers of people (who have a taste for inequality) do not support government involvement in alleviating poverty or inequality, and they opt for more punitive legal practices, especially when it comes to "others"¹ who are frequently members of racial, ethnic, or immigrant minorities.

Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (136) discuss the cultures of inequality thesis as a response to the "cultures of poverty" argument. They draw from more contemporary cultural explanations of crime and imprisonment (Jacobs and Kleban 734; Sutton 170), in addition to classical and contemporary versions of the threat hypothesis (Blalock 187; Jacobs, Carmichael and Kent

¹ Although "others" can be used to describe any sub-group of the population that has historically or more recently been subordinated by dominant groups.

660; Jacobs and Kleban 734), particularly in terms of the imprisonment of “others.”

The culture of inequality thesis is different from traditional culture of poverty or culture of dependence arguments because it does not suggest that the poor are poor because of norms and values that emerge from within their communities, which serves to reify poverty. Culture of poverty as a “theory,” claims that norms, values and beliefs carried by the poor perpetuate their circumstance and as a consequence, inequality and other social ills. Culture of poverty proponents argue that the poor refuse to take advantage of opportunities because education and work experience are not valued in their communities (Sanders 813). Some argue that perceptions of the poor as lazy, rather than unfortunate, are more rampant in the U.S. than in Europe, which leads to American voters being less likely to support redistributive policies (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 187). This is often referred to as American Exceptionalism (Lipset, 1996 17-23) although this distinction appears to be fading (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 144). The empirical evidence in support of the culture of poverty thesis is weak. For instance, Schneider and Jacoby (213) find little difference in attitudes about dependency between recipients and non recipients of aid. They report that recipients do not necessarily have different norms, attitudes and beliefs than the general population.

The culture of inequality thesis, in contrast, suggests that it is the norms, values and beliefs about inequality, the poor, minorities and immigrants, which are held by the general population that allow societies to accept having others live in disadvantaged states. In this sense, the culture of inequality thesis shares an affinity with the classical “national values” theory (e.g., Lipset, 1963 516) which posits that attitudes about individualism and egalitarianism shape welfare policy output. High tolerance for inequality in the general population have sociopolitical consequences, such as increasing punitive criminal justice policies, net the effects of other structural and institutional characteristics. We want to be clear, though, that we are not claiming that intrinsic national cultures exist independent of social structure. Rather, the beliefs associated with a culture of poverty, what we refer to as “high taste for inequality” among the populace, is a response to social and economic conditions within societies, and these values change as those conditions change.

Piven argues that all rich countries have dealt with cuts under the guise of pressures from globalization, competitiveness and wage flexibility, as well as other pressures from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Union, yet not all countries have rolled-back welfare state policies as dramatically as have some others. According to Piven, politicians do not dare to cut welfare spending where “popular resistance is too vigorous” (27). We know, for example, that mass public policy preferences influence the growth or contraction of the welfare state (Esping-Anderson 170; Huber and Stephens 322) because politicians are interested in minimizing electoral losses (Page and Shapiro 182; Burstein 31). Brooks and Manza (484) find that social policy preferences determine, in part, the cross-national variation in welfare policy output.

Therefore, we argue that social inequality, and its sociopolitical consequences, cannot be adequately explained with subcultures of poverty arguments. Rather, when inequality becomes accepted by the general public (i.e., a high taste for inequality), welfare spending is more easily reduced, and “responsibility” is placed increasingly on individuals for their failure to find employment, for their poor health, their criminal involvement, and their lack of educational attainment. Cultures of inequality, in turn, lead to an exclusion of “others” from the welfare state and create a favorable sociopolitical condition for punitive action, especially when crime becomes a salient political issue or is popularly linked to subordinated groups. And, belief in the presence of a culture of poverty sets the stage for stigmatization and social control of the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and immigrants.

Structure and Acceptance of Inequality

Contemporary cultural arguments explain the emergence of norms, values, and beliefs as a consequence of structural conditions (Anderson 110; Sampson and Bean 13-63; Miller 33). On the other hand, culture of poverty arguments makes limited reference to the structural causes of disadvantage. In contrast, the culture of inequality thesis posits that the acceptance of, or taste for, inequality in the general population is influenced by structural and institutional contexts. The most relevant of which is the actual amount of inequality in a country. It is not surprising to social scientists that social change can have negative social consequences ranging from lower social

spending (Osberg, Smeeding and Schwabish 821-859), to decreasing social capital and civic engagement (Putnam 48-61), to increasing crime (Sampson and Wilson 37-56). However, there has been less work attempting to explain links between social change, structural disadvantage and attitudes and beliefs about inequality. There is evidence that social distance or cleavages in the population shape popular beliefs about welfare. For instance, when there is a class of wealthy individuals removed from the welfare state, they are more likely to be antagonistic towards it (Svallfors, 1991 609; 1997 283; Edlund 337; Piven 29; Osberg et al. 821-859). More recently, Chamlin and Cochran (236) have suggested that the public may be more tolerant of inequality if they perceive inequality to be fair or legitimate and that these attitudes are influenced by economic development. These findings illustrate that attitudes about inequality are not independent of structural characteristics.

Second, competitiveness in the global economy is thought to require nations to roll-back welfare state benefits. But, these structural explanations may also be tied to cultural ones. For example, Piven suggests that some countries (e.g. the US), have rolled back the welfare state because of political, organizational and ideological reasons and “a popular political culture deeply infused with racism and with sexual obsessions” (29). Piven’s argument raises questions about the ways that structural features of countries shape attitudes about inequality and welfare benefits.

We argue that the contemporary cultural acceptance of inequality is also influenced by the character of the current and historic welfare state in a country (Epsing-Anderson 170; Gelissen 285; Huber and Stephens 322). This may be due to the belief that the system is being abused. Svallfors (1991 618-627) shows that this belief is widespread in Sweden where the welfare state is well entrenched. On the other hand, when there are vested interests in maintaining the welfare state (i.e., employment tied to social services and policy), then where the welfare state is large and entrenched, more people will have positive views of it.

The issues of race and immigration are also tightly intertwined with the concept of redistribution and welfare. There is a widespread argument that a population’s favorable attitudes towards immigrants determine their ability to procure welfare benefits (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 643). Scholars have examined the unwillingness to extend welfare benefits to immigrants (Vasta

195; Clarke 407). In 1996, the United States limited welfare benefits to citizens rather than to legal residents, historically redefining who is allowed to benefit from social provisions (Espenshade, Baraka, and Huber 769; Van Hook, et al. 643). In Europe, where welfare state systems have largely benefited homogenous populations, nations are struggling to redefine the nature of social welfare to reflect increasingly heterogeneous populations (see Xu's comparative analysis; Hjerm 117; Clarke and Newman 53-65). Keiser, Mueser, and Choi find "in any given county nonwhites are more likely to face sanctions than whites with similar demographic characteristics, work histories, family structures and welfare experience" (325). Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote note, "[r]acial fragmentation in the United States and the disproportionate representation of ethnic minorities among the poor clearly played a major role in limiting redistribution, and indeed, racial cleavages seem to serve as a barrier to redistribution throughout the world" (247).

Cultures of Inequality, the Threat Hypothesis and Increased Punitiveness

Blalock (187) argued that as populations become increasingly heterogeneous, minority groups come to be perceived as posing a threat to the majority. This is often referred to as the threat hypothesis. These arguments usually focus on threats to economic and material self-interest (Keely and Russell 461; Olzak 3) although others have argued that socioeconomic conditions are not enough to explain anti-immigration sentiment but rather, that political and institutional arrangements shape opinion and policy (Karapin 434). Recently, Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent (660) and Jacobs and Kleban (734) have shown that increasing minority presence, or "racial threat," helps to explain increased sentencing severity of "others." The problem, however, is that it does not appear to be the case that negative sentiments towards others is necessarily linked to these social problems. Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (140) find that it is not countries with increasingly heterogeneous populations that have higher imprisonment of "others," but rather, those with homogenous populations. They find that high tastes for inequality does explain high imprisonment of others, even in countries where the general population has favorable attitudes towards others. This suggests that the link between culture of inequality, threat and punitiveness is rather complex. The

consequence of cultures of inequality is the exclusion of minorities from the welfare state, which more generally undermines social inclusion (Morawska 611; Portes and Rumbaut 44-49; Reitz 291), and their further marginalization through more punitive legal system responses.

Here we are interested in both the variation in the general level of imprisonment within states and the degree to which they imprison “others.” General imprisonment is interesting because it may indicate a general level of punitiveness that is a consequence of social conditions and the attitudes of a citizenry. The imprisonment of “others” is our primary concern because we think that it is here that intolerance of difference and taste for inequality will help to shape who is labeled criminal or deviant, and, as a consequence, who is subjected to systems of social control; the harshest of which is imprisonment (of course execution is the harshest form of social control that is available to states, but it is less practical to study in this context because many nations do not practice capital punishment).

DATA AND ANALYSES

Our focus will be on testing whether the culture of inequality thesis, the level of taste for inequality in a population, can predict a country’s total imprisonment rate and, in particular, the imprisonment rate of “others.” To accomplish this task, we use data from a variety of sources including the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS), the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (ESCCJS), the World Bank (WB), the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Values Survey (WVS). All data are for or near the year 2000. Our unit of analysis is the country and we exclude a number of countries because of missing data. The models we analyze include 44 to 57 countries, depending on variable specifications. See Table 2 for a list of countries.

There are two dependent variables in this study: the total prison population and the total “others” in prison. The former is a measure of the total number of individuals in penal institutions including pre-trial detainees in a country, while the latter is a measure of the total number of aliens in a country’s

prison population². Data for total prison population comes from the World Prison Population List, 4th Edition, and data for the total "others" prison population comes from the ESCCJS.

We use data that measures attitudes from the WVS, which is administered independently across countries. The key independent variable is "taste for inequality." It is measured with data from the fourth wave of the WVS by using responses to the following question: "How would you place your views on this scale? "1" means you agree completely with the statement that incomes should be made more equal; "10" means you agree completely with the statement that we need larger income differences as incentives" (see Table 1). The respondents' answers to the question were summed and divided by the respective country sample size. This created a country-level variable where higher values of the measure indicate greater tolerance for income inequality within a country.

We include several control variables: racial intolerance, which is the average of two WVS items-- "Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? (A) People of a different race; (B) Immigrants/foreign workers;" modernization – an index of six country-level variables from the WB (the logged gross domestic product per capita -constant 2000 U.S. dollars, the logged electric power consumption of kWh per capita, the logged life expectancy at birth for the total population, the logged percent of literate females ages 15 and above, and the logged percent of total population that is urban dwelling); legal structure and security of property rights from the EFW; and, welfare state development³, absolute income inequality, and total immigration from the WB. Our final control, violent crime, is a measure of logged homicides per 100,000 people. The homicide data was from the UNODC. Descriptive statistics for all variables displayed in Table 1.

2 The authors calculated the values for total "others" in prison by taking the proportion of "others" in prison, as provided by the ESCCJS, and multiplying it by the values for the total number of prisoners in a country.

3 Following Books and Manza (819), "Our measure of welfare state policy output is the ratio of spending on benefits and services relative to gross domestic product."

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics					
Variable	obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Total prison population	57	112329	334168	110	1962220
Total 'others' in prison	55	25171	157543	10	1171445
Taste for inequality	48	5,81	1,02	3,69	8,09
Racial intolerance	55	-1,98	0,6	-3,61	-0,37
Modernization	57	6,01	0,73	4,26	7,21
Health expenditure	57	11,71	3,38	3,2	18,8
Migration	57	107,44	978,04	-1400	6200
Income inequality	57	3,53	0,22	3,21	4,06
Homicide	56	1,21	1,02	-0,69	3,94

Data Analysis

The present analyses estimate the effects of taste for inequality and racial intolerance on both national prison populations and the level of “others” in prison, holding other variables in the model constant. We use negative binomial regression for these analyses (Osgood 41; Osgood and Chambers 96).

Our first set of analyses is of the total prison population in a country. We begin with the control variables. Then we estimate a similar model but with the inclusion of the racial intolerance variable. We then introduce taste for inequality. We run similar models while excluding the United States since it was an outlier in the initial analyses. We use the same approach to analyze the prison population of “others” in a country.

RESULTS

Before describing the results, we present descriptions of the country-level data. Table 2 includes key values for the 57 nations. The US has the highest total prison population (1.9 million) and “others” in prison (1.17 million), while China and Bangladesh boast the second highest total prisoners (1,428,126) and “others” in prison (28,630), respectively. Generally, these countries have high values of taste for inequality and racial intolerance as well. For example, Bangladesh has some of the highest values for “others” in

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prison, taste for inequality and racial intolerance. The US, in contrast, has relatively low levels of taste for inequality (5.72) and racial intolerance (0.09), while Algeria and Peru have the highest values for taste for inequality (8.09 and 7.52, respectively) yet few “others” in prison in relation to Algeria and Peru’s total prison population. We should note that while the US is comparatively low in both taste for inequality and racial intolerance in this sample, we found both to be high in our earlier study (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 143) using a smaller sample of western industrialized nations. The US has a high taste for inequality and intolerance compared to Europe and Canada, but is low compared to the broader array, which includes less developed countries. What can be gleaned from observations of national distributions is that where there is a greater taste for, or acceptance of, inequality and intolerance of “others,” there are also larger proportions of “others” in prison.

Table 2. Country Characteristics

Country	Number of Prisoners	Number of ‘Others’ in Prison	Taste for Inequality	Racial Intolerance
Albania	3 053	12	5,96	0,24
Algeria	34 243	445	8,09	0,26
Argentina	38 604	12 739	4,9	0,05
Austria	6 915	2 600	4,56	0,1
Bangladesh	70 000	28 630	7,46	0,69
Belarus	56 000	14 560	5,27	0,17
Belgium	8 764	3 681	5,5	0,15
Bosnia	1 372	---	6,1	0,19
Bulgaria	9 283	186	6,36	0,25
Canada	31 624	8 412	5,34	0,04
Chile	31 600	916	4,02	0,1
China	1 428 126	428	6,26	0,15
Croatia	2 584	305	4,43	0,18
Czech Republic	19 320	1 816	5,49	0,14
Denmark	3 150	514	---	0,09

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Table 2. (Continued)				
Country	Number of Prisoners	Number of 'Others' in Prison	Taste for Inequality	Racial Intolerance
Estonia	4 723	1 691	6,88	0,18
Finland	3 040	258	4,61	0,12
France	50 714	11 005	4,85	0,11
Germany	78 707	8 815	---	0,09
Greece	8 343	3 537	---	0,14
Hungary	17 890	787	---	---
Iceland	110	10	5,66	0,03
India	281 380	2 814	4,18	0,4
Ireland	3 378	571	6,11	0,12
Italy	55 136	16 375	6,01	0,16
Japan	61 242	18 434	5,72	---
Kyrgyzstan	19 500	254	5,44	0,19
Latvia	8 486	51	---	0,07
Lithuania	11 216	180	5,14	0,16
Luxembourg	357	228	6,93	0,08
Macedonia	1 413	69	5,31	0,19
Malta	257	90	---	0,17
Mexico	154 765	1 392	5,13	0,14
Netherlands	14 968	8 322	6,18	0,05
Peru	27 452	604	7,52	0,11
Philippines	70 383	422	6,56	0,18
Poland	82 173	1 233	6,09	0,22
Portugal	13 384	1 606	---	0,05
Republic of Korea	62 732	1 694	6,55	0,41
Republic of Moldova	1 413	25	6,71	0,15
Romania	51 528	361	3,69	0,23
Russia	919 330	15 629	7,08	0,1
Serbia	6 276	---	5,5	0,13
Singapore	14 704	2 926	6,96	0,16

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Table 2. (Continued)

Country	Number of Prisoners	Number of 'Others' in Prison	Taste for Inequality	Racial Intolerance
Slovakia	7 509	173	---	0,2
Slovenia	1 120	171	4,05	0,14
South Africa	176 893	3 715	5,42	0,23
Spain	50 656	12 887	5,06	0,11
Sweden	6 089	1 309	---	0,03
Tanzania	44 063	88	---	0,17
Uganda	21 900	635	7,19	0,16
UK	72 669	14 025	5,6	0,12
Ukraine	198 885	3 182	7,4	0,13
United States	1 962 220	1 171 445	5,72	0,09
Venezuela	15 107	997	5,58	0,17
Vietnam	55 000	165	6,33	0,33
Zimbabwe	21 000	1 008	6,84	0,18

Note: Values for the racial intolerance variable are unlogged. Although we use logged values for the negative binomial regression analysis, we use unlogged values here for ease of interpretation and presentation.

Table 3 presents multivariate models explaining total prison population. Model 1 shows that most of the control variables are statistically significant predictors of total prison population. For every unit increase in economic development (see modernization variable), migration, and homicide, there is a respective 38%, 0.03%, and 38% increase in the prison population. Welfare state development is the only significant negative predictor of total prison population; for every unit increase in health expenditure, there is an average decrease in the prison population by 8%. As for our two variables of primary interest, racial intolerance and taste for inequality, models 2 and 3, respectively, the analyses indicate that neither have a significant effect on the prison population rate in a country. Finally, the story presented in models 1 through 3 do not change when considering American exceptionalism (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 144) and excluding the US case as an outlier (see models 4 through 6).

Table 3. Log-Odds from Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total Prison Population						
	All Cases			Excluding the United States		
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Modernization	.32* (.16)	.33* (.17)	.33** (.16)	.31* (.17)	.31* (.17)	.32* (.17)
Health expenditure	-.08** (.03)	-.07* (.04)	-.07* (.04)	-.08** (.03)	-.07* (.04)	-.07 (.05)
Migration	.0003*** (.00004)	.0003*** (.00004)	.0002*** (.00004)	.0003** (.0001)	.0003** (.0001)	.0002** (.0001)
Income inequality	.33 (.37)	.38 (.40)	.26 (.44)	.34 (.37)	.40 (.40)	.27 (.45)
Homicide	.38*** (.11)	.38*** (.11)	.35*** (.11)	.38*** (.11)	.38*** (.11)	.35*** (.12)
Racial intolerance		.04 (.14)	.03 (.19)		.05 (.15)	.04 (.21)
Taste for inequality			.003 (.10)			.002 (.10)
Constant	-2.32 (1.69)	-2.54 (1.81)	-2.17 (1.98)	-2.28 (1.69)	-2.52 (1.82)	-2.14 (1.98)
Overdispersion parameter	.32*** (.06)	.33*** (.07)	.36*** (.07)	.32*** (.06)	.33*** (.07)	.37*** (.07)
-2 pseudo log-likelihood	610,64	588,77	514,07	595,72	573,83	499,08
Wald Chi2	106,49	93,69	88,6	37,77	32,68	28,74
N	57	55	47	56	54	46

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Exposure variable = Country population size. Dispersion parameter = Mean.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed test)

The analyses of “others” in prison presented in Table 4 reveals a different story. Welfare state development and homicide are not significant predictors of “others” in prison. Only the economic development and total immigration variables predict “others” in prison. The “others” in prison rate increases by

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98% and 0.06%, respectively, with every unit increase in modernization and migration. Yet similar to the total prison population, and contrary to our hypothesis and the threat hypothesis, neither taste for inequality nor racial intolerance significantly influences the imprisonment of “others.”

Table 4. Log-Odds from Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total ‘Others’ in Prison

	All Cases			Excluding the United States		
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Modernization	.98** (.37)	1.18** (.43)	1.22** (.48)	.76* (.44)	1.00* (.48)	1.02* (.55)
Health expenditure	-.09 (.06)	-.06 (.07)	-.01 (.10)	-.07 (.06)	-.03 (.07)	.02 (.08)
Migration	.0006** (.0002)	.0005** (.0002)	.0005* (.0003)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.001)	.002* (.001)
Income inequality	-.49 (.95)	-.24 (1.03)	-.92 (1.12)	-.52 (.87)	-.24 (.92)	-.76 (1.05)
Homicide	.28 (.28)	.31 (.30)	.43 (.31)	.35 (.32)	.40 (.34)	.51 (.35)
Racial intolerance		.37 (.39)	.17 (.57)		.45 (.40)	.32 (.63)
Taste for inequality			.32 (.23)			.30* (.17)
Constant	-5.38 (4.06)	-7.10 (4.70)	-7.89 (5.84)	-4.24 (4.16)	-6.30 (4.63)	-7.28 (5.74)
Overdispersion parameter	1.34*** (.20)	1.36*** (.20)	1.40*** (.22)	1.32*** (.19)	1.34*** (.18)	1.35*** (.22)
-2 pseudo log-likelihood	483,24	463,81	398,77	466,92	447,33	381,91
Wald Chi2	24	24,02	22,65	17,07	17,53	27,69
N	55	53	45	54	52	44

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Exposure variable = Country population size. Dispersion parameter = Mean.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed test)

These results, however, may be more sensitive to the US, which is extremely far away from the other values, at 1,171,445 “others,” while the next highest countries are imprisoning “others” at 28,630 (Bangladesh) and 18,434 (Japan)⁴. This is in contrast to the total prisoners variable where intermediate values exist (China, Russia, India, and Mexico) between US and countries with much lower rates. In such situations the conventional approach is to remove the outlier and re-estimate the test statistics (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 418). As shown in models 4 through 6, removing the US case caused the story to drastically change. Economic development, immigration, and taste for inequality significantly yield higher imprisonment rates of “others.” With each unit increase in taste for inequality, there is a substantial (30%) increase in the amount of “others” in prison. There is a greater likelihood of imprisoning “others” where public opinion favors attitudes that are acceptable of persisting inequalities, reaffirming Crutchfield and Pettinicchio’s (139-143) findings⁵. “Others,” racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants, are more likely to be sanctioned – defined as deviant – by the state where there is a greater taste for inequality; a culture of inequality.

We find no support for the idea that taste for inequality or racial intolerance affects the total prison population in a country. We do, however, find support for the notion that individual attitudes favoring income inequality in a country produce higher rates of imprisonment of “others.” Yet these results only hold when excluding the American case. The control variables that are consistently significant, economic development and total immigration, lend support for the cultures of inequality and imprisonment thesis.

⁴ This is the case for other U.S. values as well, in particular, the migration variable.

⁵ When exploring the same model parameters with OLS regression and logged dependent variables we find that the results substantively change. The coefficients that are consistently significant across the OLS models is migration for total prisoners per capita and modernization and migration for total ‘others’ in prison per capita. Neither the culture of inequality nor racial threat variables are significant. This is expected under the current conditions, however, since the standard errors for OLS will be more inflated when compared to NBREG (Osgood 41).

DISCUSSION

These results appear to be perplexing. The US, which imprisons more of its population than other countries, and locks up more “others” than other nations, has high racial tolerance and low taste for inequality. Also, the US, with its high rates of imprisonment, was the driving force in our earlier analyses (Crutchfield and Pettinichio 143), affirming the culture of inequality thesis. But the present results are, in reality, not so perplexing.

First, these analyses include nations that do not have the liberal welfare state history that typifies the industrial democracies of the west. The US also does not have a very developed welfare apparatus when compared to Canada and the countries of Western Europe. Limited income support and very unequal access to health care are major political issues in the US. But there is more of a state supported welfare system there than exists in less developed nations.

Second, the US does imprison its general population and its populations of “others” more like a less developed country, but at a considerably higher rate than those nations. The US’s criminal justice system is extremely punitive. These American patterns must be considered in the context of its peculiar history of race relations – slavery, Jim Crow, and segregation – and the ways in which prisons and the justice systems are linked to race. In addition to history, other social structural and economic factors are important determinants of racial incarceration patterns (Bridges and Crutchfield 699; Bridges, Crutchfield, and Simpson 345).

Finally, when the American anomaly is taken out of consideration, these results provide important confirmation of the culture of inequality thesis. It does not predict general imprisonment. On this point, our results are inconsistent with the thesis. When it comes to punitive state treatment of “others,” however, the thesis is supported.

It is important to acknowledge that the positive relationship observed between taste for inequality and the imprisonment of “others” is after we have taken into account differences in crime rates, as measured by homicide rates. The levels of general imprisonment are consistent with national homicide rates, but imprisonment of “others” is not. This brings to mind Becker’s (1963) invocation, that deviance, in this case social control, is not a function of what one does, but who one is. “Others” are subjected to more social

control in the contexts of cultures of inequality than would be predicted solely on the basis of crime in such states. Those “others” are more likely to be labeled deviant by the state prison apparatus.

For a number of years sociologists and criminologists have demonstrated that important social, political, and economic forces determine social control practices. The present analyses indicate that culture, as represented by the attitudes and beliefs of the population, are important as well. We must emphasize that we are not saying that these attitudes and beliefs are a consequence of some intrinsic national character. They are not! Rather, the attitudes, beliefs, and values held by populations are consequences of, and responses to, structural change, including, for many counties, increasing population heterogeneity and immigration.

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